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INTRODUCTION
Ordinary rules of social interaction impose obligations of gratitude
and loyalty on those who receive a significant benefit. Moral
philosophers and sociologists generally agree that gratitude and
loyalty are essential components of organized society. What happens,
however, when the benefit conferred is a federal judgeship? For the
recipient of this prized position, the duty of impartiality is a job
requirement. Yet the demands of civil behavior may also require the
judge to express some degree of gratitude and loyalty toward her
benefactor, the government entity or individual responsible for
placing the judge in her position.' This benefactor likely holds
strong feelings about some cases coming before thejudge. Thejurist
may experience a serious struggle as the duty of impartiality clashes
with the obligations of loyalty and gratitude.
Contrary to popular perception, this struggle is not necessarily the
result of base political motivation or human frailty. Instead, the
struggle most likely reflects the judge's honest, well-meaning attempt
to accommodate all that organized society expects of her. On its
most fundamental level, this Article explores that struggle.
As always, the story is not as simple as it first appears. To begin, a
judge may never encounter a case that puts to the test any debt of
gratitude or loyalty she may bear. Moreover, some judges, because of
1. Under our constitutional scheme, federal judges are nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, quoted infra text accompanying note 147.
For lower court judges, individual Senators and other individuals from the judge's home state
may be intimately involved in the nomination and confirmation process. See infta notes 167-77
and accompanying text (expanding on political role in confirmation process). For that reason,
the identity of the judge's "benefactor" is not entirely clear.
This Article is confined to the problem of federal judges, and therefore does not deal with
loyalties and tensions that may result from the process of electing judges.
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the motivations underlying their appointment, may be less susceptible
to the conflict posed by gratitude and loyalty. In this Article, I
identify some of these permutations that may buffer a federal judge
from the clash of expectations.
On the other hand, I also show that, under many circumstances, a
judge must confront the conflict of impartiality with loyalty and
gratitude. Although our legal tradition attempts to resolve this
conflict, the clash is likely to continue, creating dissonance for the
judge and influencing the decisionmaking process. I study the
conflict below and highlight those instances where dissonance is most
likely to occur.
Part I below reviews the philosophical and sociological literature on
gratitude, loyalty, and social exchange. Analyzing the federal judiciary
in light of this material, Part II describes the duty of impartiality and
its potential conflict with gratitude, loyalty, and exchange obligations.
In Part III, I review the judicial selection process and canvass the
criteria historically employed for choosing members of the federal
judiciary. Part IV identifies the types of appointees most at risk of
suffering a conflict among expectations. Finally, I explore in Part V
whether gratitude and loyalty have any legitimate role in a judge's
work, and probe how these enduring personal expectations may affect
decisionmaking.
I. LOYALTY AND GRATITUDE: VIEWS OF
PHILOSOPHERS AND SOCIOLOGISTS
Describing a flurry of recent philosophical essays on gratitude and
loyalty, a recent review declares that "[t] he virtues are fighting back."2
Although scholarly interest in these principles may have waned for a
time, their importance in our society has been enduring. Since
ancient Greece, analysis of gratitude and loyalty has permeated many
disciplines, including philosophical compositions,' literature,4 law,5
2. Mary Midgely, Virtuous Circles, THE TIMES (London),June 18, 1993, (Literary Supp.) at
3. This review also included a work on "responsibility" in its survey of "virtues."
3. Aristotle, for example, had much to say about social exchange and loyalty within the
context of friendship. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMECHEAN ETHics, Book VIII, pts. vi-vii, at 451,
475-79 (H. Rackhamn trans., Harvard University Press 1990) (describing commitment and
exchange in friendships of equals and friendships of unequals). Other philosophers have also
discussed gratitude and loyalty. See, e.g., W.D. ROss, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 21 (1967)
(discussing duty of gratitude as one of seven important duties); see also infra notes 7-35 and
accompanying text (discussing philosophical analysis of gratitude and loyalty).
4. Shakespeare's Viola provides an excellent example:
I hate ingratitude more in a man
Than lying, vainness, babbling, drunkenness,
Or any taint of vice whose strong corruption
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and the social sciences.6
For the purpose of studying the federal judiciary, the writings of
moral philosophers and sociologists prove particularly instructive.
This Part looks to moral philosophy and sociology to lay the ground-
work for understanding why a judge who heeds the call of gratitude
and loyalty is not necessarily reprehensible, but is instead showing
fidelity to integral components of our moral and social structure.
A. The Works of Moral Philosophy
1. Gratitude
Most moral philosophers believe that gratitude has significant moral
components. Although a few philosophers suggest that gratitude is
merely a matter of etiquette,7 none disputes that gratitude includes
recognition of a benefit or kindness conferred on a beneficiary.
8
Inhabits our frail blood.
WILuAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFrH NIGHT act 3, sc. 4.
5. Law-related works have focused primarily on loyalty. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALIrY OF RELATIONSHIPS 78-100 (1993) (discussing role of loyalty
in law governing testimonial privileges, surrogate motherhood, gift giving, inheritance, and
freedom of religion);JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 250-61 (1979) (exploring analogy
between respect for law and loyalties of friendship); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The
MoralFoundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1065 (1976) (discussing loyalty
in lawyer-client relationship).
6. Psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists have all devoted
considerable energy to the study of loyalty and gratitude. See generally GRAHAM A. ALLAN,
FRIENDSHIP (1989) (examining role of friendship and loyalty in our social structure); HERBERT
A. BLOCH, THE CONCEPT OF OUR CHANGING LOYALTIES (1934) (using social psychology of loyalty
. to develop theory of social individual); VALERIAN J. DERLEGA & BARBARA A. WINSTEAD,
FRIENDSHIP AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (1986) (describing studies on social psychology of
friendships); MELANIE KLEIN, ENVYAND GRATITUDE (1957), reprinted in MELANIE KLEIN, ENVYAND
GRATITUDE AND OTHERWORKS 176,187-89 (1975) (exploring psychoanalytic connection between
gratitude, love, and generosity); JOHN H. SCHAAR, LOYALTY IN AMERICA (1957) (analyzing
political loyalty in American democracy); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLrrICAL
OBLIGATIONS 157-90 (1979) (analyzing gratitude as basis for political obligation); EDWARD
WEISBAND & THOMAS M. FRANCK, RESIGNATION IN PROTEST (1975) (examining political and
ethical choices between loyalty to team and loyalty to conscience in American political life).
7. Daniel Lyons, The OddDebt of Gratitude, 29 ANALYSIS 92, 92 (1969) (describing gratitude
as "norm of etiquette"); see also I WILLIAM GODWIN, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICALJUSTICE
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON GENERAL VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS 42-47 (Raymond A. Preston ed., 1926)
(arguing that one need not show any particular kindness to benefactors). According to Godwin,
gratitude is "no part either ofjustice or virtue." Id. at 43. For the purpose of this assertion,
Godwin understands gratitude to be "a sentiment of preference which would lead me to prefer
one man to another from some other consideration than that of his superior usefulness or
worth." Id.
8. SeeJoHN BALGUY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL GOODNESS (1734), reprinted in I BRITISH
MORALISTS 1650-1800, at 186, 188 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1969) (observing that receiver of benefits
not only should be, but is, obliged to be grateful); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 248-49 (MaryJ. Gregor trans., 1991) (positing that gratitude shows respect and honor
to person who has shown kindness); see also Andrew Oldenquist, Loyalties, 79 J. PHIL. 173, 184
(1982) (suggesting that gratitude is response of one who has been "provided. . . with certain
benefits and protections").
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There is also no dispute that the concept of gratitude has powerful
common-sense and intuitive appeal. Perhaps nowhere is this
sentiment more forcefully expressed than by Shakespeare's King Lear,
who, after being revolted by his daughter's repeated failure to
discharge her obligations, declared, "How sharper than a serpent's
tooth it is to have a thankless child. ... Ingratitude, thou marble-
hearted fiend, more hideous when thou show'st thee in a child than
the sea-monster."9 Early philosophers echoed this recognition of a
child's duty to a parent.1 In addition, they invoked gratitude to
explain the obligation of humans to God.
In some early examples, philosophers treated gratitude as a general
duty, an unquestionable obligation. For example, British moralist
John Balguy declared in 1734: "That a man ought to be grateful to
his benefactors, may be looked upon as equivalent to a self-evident
proposition." 2 David Hume was equally unambiguous, writing that
"[o]f all crimes that human creatures are capable of committing, the
most horrid and unnatural is ingratitude." 3 Even Hobbes included
gratitude in his fourth "Law of Nature" as necessary to inspire humans
to engage in benevolent action. 4
Later writings commonly expressed a more restrained view of
gratitude. Nevertheless, moral philosophers have repeatedly cited
gratitude's role in fostering mutual trust and beneficence among
humans. For example, utilitarian philosophers find a prominent
place for gratitude in their social vision.15 As explained recently by
Terrance McConnell, acts of gratitude promote important values:
"[T]hey acknowledge the moral importance of the benefactor's
original act, thus rewarding merit; they promote respect, the kind of
9. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act 1, sc. 4.
10. See SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 164-65 (citing Socrates' reliance on "paradigmatic
obligation of gratitude which children are thought to owe to their parents"). For an interesting
contemporary look at loyalty and parent-child relationships, see Drucilla Cornell, Loyalty and the
Limits of Kantian Impartiality, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2081, 2085 (1994) (book review) ("[T]he
dominance of the view of the self as constituted only through its own auto-genesis is based on
a profound erasure of the ethical significance of the mother.").
11. SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 165.
12. BALGuy, supra note 8, at 189. Another British moralist, Richard Price, lists gratitude as
one of his six "heads of virtue." RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEw OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN
MORALS 152 (D.D. Raphael ed., Oxford University Press 1974) (1787). Price explained, "The
consideration that we have received benefits, lays us under peculiar obligations to the persons
who have conferred them; and renders that behavior, which to others maybe innocent, to them
criminal." Id.
13. DAviD HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 466 (Selby Bigge ed., Oxford University
Press 1967).
14. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 105 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University Press 1991)
(1651).
15. See TERRANCE McCONNELL, GRATITUDE 119 (1993) (discussing "utilitarian basis of
gratitude as a moral requirement").
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respect that is earned; they further well-being and beneficence, and
they foster good social relations." 6 Gratitude therefore has a ready
place in utilitarian moral systems, which are designed to ensure the
greatest good for the greatest number of individuals.
Even those who do not follow a utilitarian approach embrace
gratitude as an important component of ethical philosophy. For
Immanuel Kant, gratitude "must be regarded especially as a sacred
duty... whose violation can destroy the moral incentive for benevo-
lence." 7 Although Kant's full account of gratitude is complex,"8 his
starting point is straightforward. He writes, "[G]ratitude consists of
honoring a person because of a kindness he has done us. The feeling
connected with this recognition is respect for the benefactor (who
puts one under obligation).""
2. Loyalty
For the purposes of this Article, gratitude and loyalty are closely
related, since a beneficiary can show gratitude to a benefactor
through the expression of loyalty. Nevertheless, loyalty differs from
gratitude because it is not necessarily reactive." One can develop
loyalty to an individual, a group, or a cause independent of any
benefit received." Loyalty is generally the product of a complex,
ongoing relationship between an individual and the object of that
individual's loyalty.2 The sentiment is often generated over time
through an intricate web of social interactions23 By contrast,
gratitude is an obligation frequently generated by a single beneficial
16. MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 134. Some utilitarians are, however, unwilling to classify
gratitude as a duty or an obligation. See, e.g., JAN NARVESON, MORALITY AND UTIITY 177-78
(1967) (stating that holding gratitude to be obligation would "turn gift-giving into a sort of
psychological exploitation").
17. KANT, supra note 8, at 249.
18. See MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 163-72 (summarizing Kant's account of gratitude).
19. KANT, supra note 8, at 248-49. For a discussion of gratitude from a philosophical
perspective separate from utilitarianism and Kantism, see MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 172-78,
which focuses on the ethics of virtue.
20. SeeJOHN LADD, LOYALTY, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 97, 98 (Paul Edwards ed.,
1972), ("[L]oyalty may often be one-sided, although it need not be.").
21. See LADD, supra note 20, at 98 (discussing parameters of loyalty).
22. See LADD, supra note 20, at 98 (explaining special ties between members of loyalty
relationship that "provide both the necessary and specific conditions" for such relationship to
arise).
23. As Josiah Royce eloquently explained:
[A] nything which can link various people by fixed social ties may suggest to somebody
the opportunity for a lifelong loyalty .... Wherever there are mothers and brethren,
and kindred of any degree, and social organizations of any type; where men accept
offices, or pledge their word, or as in the pursuit of science or of art, cooperate in the
search.
JOSIAH ROYCE, PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY 54-55 (1908).
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act or series of related acts.
24
In defining loyalty, philosophers generally agree that loyalty is a
social concept.' The study of loyalty involves inquiry into "networks
of personal and economic relationships-of friends and acquaintanc-
es, of families and nations, of corporations, universities, and religious
communities." 26 Disagreement emerges, however, over the precise
moral content of the sentiment.
Some philosophers question whether, as an abstract concept, loyalty
has any special moral significance.27 In particular, for utilitarians,
the moral status of loyalty depends wholly on its consequences. 8
Acting loyally toward an individual, group, country, or institution can
be wrong if the loyalty undermines a greater good to an equal or
larger whole.29
Other philosophers argue that loyalty has independent moral value.
Some go so far as to identify loyalty as an ultimate good or "first
principle.""° At the beginning of the twentieth century, idealist
philosopherJosiah Royce claimed with notable vigor that "[i] n loyalty,
when loyalty is properly defined, is the fulfillment of the whole moral
law.'" More recent work by George Fletcher avoids such extrava-
gant claims, but nonetheless emphasizes loyalty as an essential social
phenomenon:
When we take people as they are, we are led to understand and to
appreciate the critical role of loyalty in buttressing theories of
justice. Loyalty is a critical element in a theory of justice; for we
invariably need some basis for group cohesion, for caring about
others, for seeing them not as strangers who threaten our security
but as partners in a common venture.32
Fletcher makes an important point: whatever the precise role of
loyalty in moral philosophy, its place in society is undeniable.
Understanding loyalty is understanding "who we are in our friend-
24. One notable exception to this proposition is the gratitude said to emerge from the
parent-child relationship, which is characterized by more than a related series of beneficial acts.
See SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 164-65 (discussing gratitude in parent-child relationship).
25. SeeFLETCHER, supra note 5, at 25 (defining loyalty by reference to "[a)ctions of standing
by one's friends, family, nation, or people"); ROYCE, supra note 23, at 20 (observing that
"[1]oyaltyis social"); Michael K McChrystal, Lauers and Loyalty, 33 WM. &MARY L. REV. 367,371
(1992) ("Loyalty becomes a term of moral discourse when it involves social action.").
26. FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 3.
27. See LADD, supra note 20, at 98 (explaining that utilitarians and empiricists attribute no
moral significance to loyalty).
28. See LADD, supra note 20, at 98 (describing utilitarian definition of loyalty).
29. Oldenquist, supra note 8, at 180.
30. McChrystal, supra note 25, at 370 (citing Oldenquist, supra note 8, at 180).
31. ROYCE, supra note 23, at 371.
32. FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 21.
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ships, loves, family bonds, national ties, and religious devotion.""
Fletcher brings new vigor to the social underpinnings of loyalty,
arguing that abandoning loyalty forces individuals both to ignore ties
with other people and to sacrifice the opportunity to honor them-
selves and others by acknowledging the unique sources of their own
identity.' Indeed, the works of other contemporary philosophers
also show that many human interactions would not happen without
trust in others to act loyally."
B. The Works of Sociology
When exploring obligations between recipient and benefactor,
sociologists do not often press into service the terms "loyalty" and
"gratitude." 6 Instead, they use words such as "reciprocity," "ex-
change," "friendship," and "balance" to analyze the recipients of
significant gains. In addition, the relevant sociological work often
focuses more on descriptive analysis than on the aspirational
standards articulated by moral philosophers. Despite these differenc-
es in rhetoric and approach, moral philosophy and sociology share a
common understanding: a force exists in organized society that
motivates recipients to acknowledge a benefactor's conferral of
benefit."7
Sociological theory exploring this phenomenon starts with the
notion of interactions between persons as an exchange of material or
immaterial goods, analogous to a quid pro quo in contract law. 8 In
33. FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 175; see also LADD, supra note 20, at 98 (stressing that loyalty
relationships are necessary for social transactions).
34. FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 16,87; see also Christina Whitman, Whose Loyalties?, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 1266, 1267 (1993) (reviewing critique of impartial ethical systems in FLETCHER, supra
note 5).
35. See, e.g., MARCIA BARON, THE MORAL STATUS OF LOYALTY 10-11 (1984) (identifying
examples of friends who expect loyalty in form of keeping confidences and corporations who
support employees on expectation that employees will not divulge trade secrets).
36. A notable exception is George Simmel, whose work includes an analysis of"faithfulness"
and "gratitude." See George Simmel, Faithfulness and Gratitude, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORGE
SIMMEL 377, 379-95 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., 1950) (analyzing sociological importance of
faithfulness and gratitude).
37. As contrasted to loyalty, gratitude is more closely tied to the process of reacting to the
act of another. See PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 94 (1967) (stating that
social exchange engenders "feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust"). Gratitude
thus bears a closer kinship with sociological concepts of exchange. Indeed, social scientists have
often made explicit the connection between social exchange and the concept of gratitude. See
MARCEL MAuss, THE GIT 63 (1967) ("The gift not yet repaid debases the man who accepted
it, particularly if he did so without thought of return."); MICHAEL E. ROLOFF, INTERPERSONAL
COMMUNICATION-THE SOCIAL EXCHANGE APPROACH 17 (1981) (observing that social dealings
"create feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust").
38. See, e.g., BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SocIETY 46-49 (1976)
(describing mutuality and repayment of services as bases of social cohesion); ROLOFF, supra note
37, at 14 (explaining how social exchange has been said to involve "protraction" and "reac-
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the words of one sociologist: "[T]he principle of reciprocity implies
a system of interdependent parts engaged in mutual interchanges."39
The work of George Simmel treats this concept as fundamental;
according to Simmel, social equilibrium and cohesion could not exist
without "the reciprocity of service and return service."4" Simmel
posited that "all contacts among men rest on the schema of giving
and returning the equivalence."41
This idea of reciprocity has clear limitations. Simplistically applied,
the concept fails to account for such social phenomena as exploita-
tion of one group of individuals by another and instances where
culture prompts an individual to engage in one-sided giving.
42
Similarly, the concept does not explain why individuals occasionally
refuse benefits or respond to a benefit with resentment rather than
gratitude.4' Nor does the notion necessarily provide an adequate
framework for analyzing instances where benefits are obtained
through coercion. 4" Finally, anthropologist Annette Weiner has
tion"-with one person giving or denying "resource to another (protraction) which elicits a
certain response from the other person (reaction)"); George Homans, Social Behavior as
Exchange; 63 AM.J. OF SOC. 597, 597 (1958) (describing exchange theory).
Richard Emerson has explained that social exchange theory in sociology differs from the idea
of a market in economic analysis in that social exchange theory begins with the concept of a
"longitudinal exchangerelation" between two specific actors. Richard M. Emerson, Toward a Theory
of Value in SocialExchange in SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY (Karen S. Cook ed., 1987). Some social
science work divides the study of exchange into two categories: "business-like exchange" and
"reciprocal gift." Joseph M. Perillo, Exchange Contract and Law in the Stone Age, 31 ARIZ. L. REV.
18, 24-25 (1989).
39. Alvin W. Gouldner, Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory, in SYMPOSIUM ON
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 249 (Llewellyn Gross ed., 1959).
40. Simmel, supra note 36, at 387.
41. Simmel, supra note 36, at 387; see also Claude Levi-Strauss, The Principle of Reciprocity
(1949), reprinted in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 61-70 (Lewis A. Coser & Bernard Rosenberg eds.,
1975) (describing exchange of reciprocal gifts in primitive societies as representing all aspects
ofsociety, reflecting "social and religious, magic and economic, utilitarian and sentimental, legal
and moral significance").
42. SeeAlvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminayy Statement, 25 AM. Soc. REV.
161, 164-67 (1960) (describing "'exploitation' problem" and social "prescriptions of one-sided
or unconditional generosity," such as noblesse oblige and Roman notion of clemency).
One can, of course, fit unconditional gifts into an exchange analysis. See LUDWIG VON MISES,
HUMAN ACTION 196 (1949) (explaining how making one-sided gifts is "altruistic exchange,"
whereby "donor acquires the satisfaction which the better condition of the receiver gives to
him"). See generallyJane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. LJ. 155, 173-79 (1988-1989)
(surveying social science literature that recognizes and analyzes empirical evidence of altruistic
social behavior).
43. See Gouldner, supra note 42, at 164-67 (explaining problems of reciprocity theory).
44. See BLAU, supra note 37, at 91. In describing such coercion, Peter Blau explained:
An individual may give another money because the other stands in front of him with
a gun in a holdup. While this could be conceptualized as an exchange of money for
his life, it seems preferable to exclude the rule of physical coercion from the range of
social conduct encompassed by the term "exchange."
Id.; see also Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295 (1992) (analyzing how line
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recently criticized reciprocity theory for failing to account for the
powerful attachment of people to certain precious treasures, which
people seek to hoard rather than exchange.4"
Even for those who are quick to emphasize the limitations in the
reciprocity principle, social exchange stands as a pervasive social
norm.46 According to one sociologist writing in the 1950s and 1960s,
"a norm of reciprocity, in its universal form, makes two interrelated,
minimal demands: (1) people should help those who have helped
them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped
them."47 Under this view, the reciprocity standard promotes stability
in social systems by perpetuating a stream of exchanges and may even
impel social interaction by assuring those initiating an exchange that
recipients of benefits are obliged to repay them."
In analyzing gift-giving institutions in various societies, several social
scientists have reinforced these principles.49 Marcel Mauss, in
particular, has identified social rituals marked by the apparently
voluntary, generous, and spontaneous presentation of gifts. 0 Close
study revealed, however, that these gift-giving rituals were in fact
driven by obligation and economic self-interest.5 ' Despite the initial
appearance to the contrary, gift-giving was therefore part of a
reciprocity system. Through what Mauss described as the "three
obligations"--giving, receiving, and repaying-gift-giving performed
an important function of resource exchange.52 Mauss's work does
between gift and exchange is blurred).
45. ANNETmE B. WEINER, INALIENABLE POSSESSIONS: THE PARADOX OF KEEPING-WHILE-GVNG
5-6 (1992) ("Searching for the kinds of possessions that people try to keep out of circulation is
far more theoretically meaningful than assuming that exchange simply involves the reciprocity
of gift giving.").
46. Although assailing classic exchange theory as superficial, Annette Weiner even accepts
exchange as a premise within which people try to accommodate their desire not to let go of
certain "inalienable possessions." Id. at 40. In her words, "all exchange is predicated on a
universal paradox-how to keep-while-giving." Id at 5.
47. Gouldner, supra note 43, at 171; see also BLAU, supra note 37, at 92 (citing "fundamental
and ubiquitous norm of reciprocity").
48. Gouldner, supra note 43, at 174-77; cf. BLAU, supra note 37, at 92 (positing that norm
of reciprocity is not fundamental starting mechanism of social intercourse; rather, reciprocity
merely "reinforces and stabilizes tendencies inherent in the character of social exchange itself").
49. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 38, at 172-74 (terming reciprocity "the basis of social
structure"); MAUSS, supra note 37, at 13 (discussing obligations both to receive and to give).
50. See MAUSS, supra note 37, at 1-7 (discussing gift-giving in various social situations).
Mauss framed much of his analysis by reference to the "potlatch," a social institution often
identified with the giving binges occasionally indulged in by the Kwakiutl Indians of the Pacific
Northwest. Id.
51. MAUSS, supra note 37, at 5-7. See generally Rose, supra note 44, at 298-99 (summarizing
anthropological literature analyzing potlatch).
52. MAUSS, supra note 37, at 39; see also id. at 1 (characterizing gift-giving as "nothing less
than the division of labour itself"). For a more recent work on this subject, see generally Arjun
Appadurai, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Valu in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS:
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not refute the possibility of a true gift or an altruistic act within
society.53  Nor does it account for symbolic possessions-"imbued
with the intrinsic and ineffable identities of their owners"m-which are
so difficult to give away.54 Nevertheless, his analysis helps to docu-
ment the pervasiveness and importance of reciprocity in social
traditions."
Related to Mauss's work is another particularly pertinent field of
scholarship: the study of friendships. Using principles of social
exchange, friendship scholars have observed that reciprocity does not
rest simply on the symmetry of give and take between two individuals.
Rather, reciprocity can be rooted in the creation of a relation among
individuals so that the relation itself, not the mere receipt of a
benefit, generates the obligation to reciprocate for the benefit.56
Drawing from friendship studies, one can argue that the obligation
to reciprocate for a benefit is a general duty created by membership
in a social system. According to one friendship study, the social
system, like a friendship, embodies "an intricate web of reciprocal
dispositions and attitudes, practical, emotional, and cognitive."" Just
as a friendship is a relationship, so too is membership in society. As
a member of society, one does not incur an obligation to reciprocate
that is tied to a particular benefit.5" Nor can one discharge one's
COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERsPECTIVE 3, 10-12 (1986) (criticizing tendency of some scholars
to distinguish sharply between gift-giving and market exchange).
53. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL & PUB. AFFAIRS 343, 344 (1972)
(analyzing unilateral transactions, and taking issue with notion that "allocation of goods and
services is not accomplished entirely by exchange"); Baron, supra note 42, at 173-79 (reviewing
empirical studies of altruism in organ donation).
54. WEINER, supra note 45, at 6. Annette Weiner calls these possessions "inalienable." She
argues that ideally, owners keep these inalienable possessions "within the closed context of
family, descent group, or dynasty." Id. The loss of these possessions, Weiner maintains,
"diminishes the self and by extension, the group to which the person belongs." Id.
55. See Rose, supra note 44, at 299 (observing that in their discussion of "gift exchanges,"
Mauss and other anthropologists do "not make the unilateral gift sound like a very robust"
concept); see also Thomas D. Barton, Expectations, Institutions, and Meanings, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1805,
1811 (1989) (book review) (describinggiftexchange patterns thatare "notonlyinstitutionalized,
but also highly meaningful to the culture").
56. See Keith E. Davis & MichaelJ. Todd, AssessingFriendship: Prtotypes, Paradigm Cases and
Relationship Description, in UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 19 (Steve Duck & Daniel
Perlman eds., 1985) (describing archetypal case of friendship as "relationship which is mutual
and reciprocal," in which participants are "inclined to provide each other with assistance and
support, and ... to count on each other in times of need, trouble, or personal distress"); cf.
FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 7 (pointing out that, like friendship, "the question of loyalty does not
arise in the abstract but only in the context of a particular relationship").
57. JOSEPH RAz, THE AuTHORiTy OF LAW 257 (1979). Professor Raz uses the analogy of
friendship to explore the foundation, if any, of any obligation of humans to obey the law.
58. Cf. GRAHAM A. ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP: DEVELOPING A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 20-21
(1989) (describing how within friendship, equivalence is "not calculated precisely on the basis
of what each side consumes," but is instead "achieved by a more rough and ready calculation,
which serves to indicate that each side is willing to give to the other, while nonetheless ensuring
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duty through a particular act Instead, the obligation springs from
the individual's relationship with society, and can never truly be shed
so long as the relationship continues. 9 Moreover, the process of
exchange strengthens the relationship, generating trust and further
obligation."
Although this Article draws primarily on an analysis of direct
reciprocity between specific individuals, the membership concept
underlying friendship study is also instructive. Friendship study helps
us appreciate the prominence of exchange in creating and maintain-
ing an individual's membership in social groups. As applied to a
federal judge, friendship analysis can drive home the social impor-
tance of ajudge making a return gesture toward the entities responsi-
ble for the judgeship.
Alternatively, friendship study recognizes that the relationship
among friends is often more important than the direct return of a
benefit.61 Thus, friendship analysis also sheds light on those instanc-
es where membership in a group may excuse a federal judge from the
obligation of reciprocity. Before further exploring these lessons from
the sociological literature, however, I first undertake a more searching
review of the dilemma posed by a federal judge's duty of impartiality.
II. THE PROBLEM FOR FEDERAL JUDGES
The principles outlined in the philosophical and sociological
literature illustrate the same message for the federal judge: when an
individual accepts a job as coveted as a federal judgeship, society
usually expects that individual to show appreciation to the entity who
made the job possible. From this starting point, a question arises
whether the judge can express this appreciation without sacrificing
that neither is in the other's debt"); Gouldner, supra note 42, at 175 (arguing that because norm
of reciprocity acts as agent of social cohesion, there is "ambiguity as to whether indebtedness
has been repaid and, over time, [this ambiguity] generates uncertainty about who is in whose
debt").
59. Gouldner, supra note 42, at 175. This approach is consistent with a theory of indirect
exchanges. As described by Peter Blau:
[C]onformity to social pressures tends to entail indirect exchanges. Men make
charitable donations, not to earn the gratitude of the recipients, whom they never see,
but to earn the approval of their peers who participate in the philanthropic campaign.
Donations are exchanged for social approval, though the recipients of the donations
and the suppliers of the approval are not identical, and the clarification of the
connections between the two requires an analysis of the complex structures of indirect
exchange ....
BLAU, supra note 37, at 92.
60. See BLAU, supra note 37, at 94 (observing how social exchanges build trust because
exchanges continue and slowly expand).
61. ALLAN, supra note 58, at 20-21 (noting that parties in friendships are more concerned
with mutual assistance rather than tracking benefits and debts).
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the duty of impartiality that is essential to the job. There are several
potential "solutions" for coping with this question. The judge may
avoid the question altogether because no case before the judge ever
involves the persons or entities to whom the judge is obligated. It is
also possible that gratitude and loyalty do not require acts that
compromise the impartiality duty. Alternatively, the judge may not
worry about gratitude and loyalty because they are "trumped" by the
superior obligation of impartiality.
To analyze these issues, this Part surveys the duty of impartiality
imposed on federal judges, and compares this duty with the general
expectations of gratitude and loyalty. Armed with this expanded
understanding, I then identify where loyalty, gratitude, and impartiali-
ty may clash.
A. The Duty of Impartiality
The need for an independent, impartial federal judiciary is firmly
entrenched in our historical tradition. Indeed, the Declaration of
Independence complains that the King of England "made Judges
dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, and the
Amount and Payment of their Salaries." 2 The Federalist Papers
continued this theme, heralding the proposed life-tenure provision in
the Constitution as "certainly one of the most valuable of the modern
improvements in the practice of government."" Alexander Hamil-
ton characterized life tenure for judges as "the best expedient which
can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and
impartial administration of the laws."" Other structural components
of our federal constitutional scheme, such as the provision for
diversity jurisdiction, reflect the framers' concern with promoting
judicial independence and impartiality.'
62. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776). Professors Redish and Marshall
document the right to an independent adjudicator as a "crucial" element of English common
law and the law of the colonies in America. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall,
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 479-81 (1986).
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
64. Id.
65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("U]udicial Power shall extend to . . .Controversies ...
between Citizens of different States."). Describing this provision, Chief Justice Marshall
explained:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as
impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that
the Constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with
such indulgence the possible fears and apprehension of suitors, that it established
national tribunals for the decision of controversies... between citizens of different
states.
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); see also U.S. CONST. art.
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Impartiality continues as part of the "received wisdom" today."
Supreme Court opinions," federal statutes,' and the Code of
Judicial Conduct for United States Judges 9 all admonish judges to
be impartial and detached, to hear both sides of the controversy and
to judge their cases fairly and independently. This duty of impartiality
is often trotted proudly before the American public in confirmation
hearings, where nominees routinely refuse to answer detailed
questions on issues likely to come before them once they are on the
bench.70
III, § 1 (proclaiming thatjudges "shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office"). Alexander Hamilton
succinctly explained the connection between this salary provision and judicial independence:
"a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79,
at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
66. Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for our Judges, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1878, 1881-82 (1988).
67. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988)
(explaining thatjudges have ongoing duty"to take steps necessary to maintain public confidence
in the impartiality of the judiciary"); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972)
(noting that litigant is entitled to have neutral and detached judge hear case); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is violated
where individual's liberty or property is subjected "to thejudgment of a court the judge of which
has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his
case").
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) (detailing procedure for challenging bias or prejudice of
judge); id. § 455 (providing for disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate where her
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
69. See CODE OF CONDUCt FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES canon 3(C) (amended 1992)
[hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT] (setting standard to govern federaljudges, adopted byJudicial
Conference of United States). Canon 3(C) provides in relevant part:
(1) A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances
where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; .... (c) the
judge knows that, individually or as a fiduciary, the judge or the judge's spouse or
minor child residing in the judge's household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding, .... (e) the judge
has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as
counsel, advisor, or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an
opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.
Id.
70. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Ginsburg PromisesJudicial Restraint fSheJoins Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1993, at Al. Then-judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg informed the SenateJudiciary Committee
that:
It would be wrong for me to say or preview in this legislative chamber how I would cast
my vote on questions the Supreme Court may be called upon to decide .... Ajudge
sworn to decide impartially can offer no forecasts, no hints, for that would show not
only disregard for the specifics of the particular case, it would display disdain for the
entire judicial process.
Id.; see also Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the
Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 68, 75 (1991) (noting routine refusal of
Supreme Court nominees to answer certain questions on ground of "professional norms of
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The Supreme Court has found protection in the Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment for the right of individual litigants to an
independent adjudicator.7' Although federal law contains no precise
definition of what it means for a judge to be impartial, the relevant
standards emphasize disengagement and dispassion.7' Anything
giving the judge a "personal" connection with a case is seen as a
threat to fairness.73 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
prohibited adjudicators from hearing cases in which they have
become personally embattled with a litigant,74 possess a personal
stake in the result,75 or were personally entangled in the litigated
incidents. 7' Federal law also suggests that the standard for impartial-
ity is quite strict. Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has ruled that
actual partiality need not be shown for disqualification-potential bias
or the appearance of partiality is enough.77
Despite the broad rhetoric of the legal standards and traditions,
established judicial practices fall substantially short of the ideal of
impartiality").
71. SeeMarshall v.Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (finding that due process requires
"impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases"); Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523
(asserting due process protections against adjudicator with "direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest" in outcome of case); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing right to trial
by "impartial jury" in criminal cases). But cf. Redish & Marshall, supra note 62, at 475-79
(suggesting that Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence has paid insufficient attention to
necessity of independent adjudicator).
72. See Resnik, supra note 66, at 1882 (explaining that under classical view ofjudicial role,
"'[d]isengagement and dispassion supposedly enable judges to decide cases fairly and
impartially'" (quotingJudith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982))); see also
Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 n.10 (1982) (opinion of
Brennan,J.) (emphasizing importance of Article III's life tenure provision to promote "judicial
individualism" by insulating judges from improper influences from colleagues and other
branches of government).
73. For example, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges calls for disqualification when
the judge has a "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." CODE OF CONDUCT, supra
note 69, canon 3C(1) (a) (emphasis added); see also supra note 69 (reporting text of Canon
3C(1) (a)).
74. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971) (holding that judge may not
adjudicate defendant's criminal contempt resulting from argument with same judge).
75. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824-25 (1986) (holding that judge may
not decide legal issue that will stand as precedent in another case in which judge is litigant);
Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59, 61-62 (1972) (finding that mayor cannot adjudicate
criminal proceedings where fines are added by mayor to village revenues).
76. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (stating that welfare official reviewing
termination of benefits must not have been involved in initial decision to terminate); In Re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 138-39 (1955) (holding that judge who acted as grand jury may not
adjudicate resulting contempt charges).
77. See Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (noting that "justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice'" (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954))); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 532 (1927) (holding that where judge's financial interest is at issue, disqualification is
appropriate where there exists "possible temptation to the average man as a judge"); see also
Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 822 (endorsing Tumey standard).
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absolute disinterest, disengagement, and impartiality." Our legal
traditions, however, do not explicitly acknowledge many "exceptions"
to the impartiality requirement.79 Only careful scrutiny reveals that
accepted practices fall short of the pristine model found in federal
case law, statutes, and codes. Such practices include allowing judges
to hear cases while bearing demonstrable bias against a party's
counsel,80 permitting judges to rule on disqualification motions filed
against them,"1 empowering judges to find contempt violations of
their own orders, 2 and authorizing judges to reject potentially
meritorious impartiality challenges because the challenges are stale or
waived. 3
The discrepancy between theory and practice has done little to
mitigate the articulated premise that a judge's impartiality obligation
is unqualified. 4 In addition, other trends in the law highlight
78. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 62, at 492 (positing that "[r]eality forces us to tolerate
some bias").
79. See Resnik, supra note 66, at 1887-1903 (reviewing various examples of gap between
"rhetoric and reality" in legal standards governing impartiality). The rule of necessity, which
allows an interested judge to take part in a decision if there is no other forum for adjudicating
the dispute, is a prominent example of an explicit exception to the impartiality rule. See United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980) (stating that "'although ajudge had better not, if it can
be avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not
only may but must do so if the case cannot be heard otherwise'" (quoting FREDERICK POLLACK,
A F1Rsr BOOK OFJURISPRUDENCE 270 (6th ed. 1929))). One can argue, however, that the courts
have been less than candid in dealing with this issue. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 62, at
492 (criticizing Will's misleading use of term "necessity" in explaining rule of necessity); Resnik,
supra note 66, at 1892-96 (listing alternative adjudicators in response to federal court claims
under rule of necessity); see also CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 69, canon 3C(4) (allowingjudge
to continue to adjudicate matters in which judge has financial interest where judge has devoted
substantial time to matter before appearance or discovery of interest so long asjudge divests any
personal interest).
80. John Leubsdorf, Thorks ofJudgingandJudgeDiqualficatin, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 238
(1987).
81. See id. at 242 (describing as "bizarre" rule that calls on allegedly biased judge to decide
adequacy of bias proof); Resnik, supra note 66, at 1887 (describing federal disqualification
statutes, where "parties challenging judges make applications for disqualification to the very
judges sought to be disqualified").
82. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (upholding lower court's
authority to impose coercive contempt fines); see also International Union, United Mine Workers
v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2560-61 (1994) (explaining that where court adjudicates contempt
committed beyond its presence, "risk of erroneous deprivation from the lack of a neutral
factfinder may be substantial").
83. Professor Judith Resnik has noted that some courts have barred attempts to obtain
disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144 as untimely. Resnik, supra note 66, at 1897 n.59
(collecting cases). Professor Resnik also cites certain principles of federal habeas corpus
litigation that prevent a federal judge from reaching the merits of impartiality challenges. Id.
at 1897.
84. Resnik, supra note 66, at 1922 (positing that those aspiring to craft new rules ofjudicial
conduct do not require impartiality in absolute terms, but continue to speak as though absolute
impartiality is required); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 80, at 245 (describing how lawyers and
legislators too frequently proclaim "the importance of impartiality without thinking about what
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impartiality's importance. Modem legal theorists, for example, have
posited that independent adjudication is a core component of
procedural due process.' Under this view, procedural safeguards
such as notice, hearing, and legal counsel have little or no real
instrumental value if the decisionmaker deviates from impartiality
standards.86
Supplementing this legal literature are forces that drive home the
moral necessity of impartiality. Indeed, modem society has tradition-
ally held impartiality and the related concept of equality as
benchmarks.8 7 As a general matter, contemporary moral principles
require specific justification for giving someone extraordinary
treatment or special consideration.8
For these reasons, a judge embarking on a career in the federal
system proceeds with heavy baggage, legal and otherwise, admonish-
ing the judge to maintain an unwavering standard of impartiality.
This baggage (at least initially) appears powerfully in tension with the
obligations of gratitude and loyalty the judge may also bear.
B. What Do Gratitude, Loyalty, and Social Exchange Require?
1. General principles
Gratitude and loyalty require an individual to be partial. Indeed,
it might mean"). Judge Jerome N. Frank offers another perspective:
Democracy must, indeed, fail unless our courts try cases fairly, and there can be no fair
trial before a judge lacking in impartiality and disinterestedness. If, however, "bias"
and "partiality" be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind
of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will.
In reJ.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943).
85. Redish & Marshall, supra note 62, at 476; see alsoJerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due
Process: The Quest for a Dignitay Theoty, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 899 (1986) (arguing that equality
demands that "techniques for making collective decisions not imply that one person's or group's
contribution (facts, interpretation, policy argument, etc.) is entitled to greater respect than
another's merely because of the identity of the person or group"). See generalyJon Graydon,
Authority of the TrialJudge, Tweny-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts ofAppeals 1991-1992,81 GEO. L.J. 1338, 1338-39 (1993) (reviewing federal court
cases that discuss due process right to judge who is free from bias).
86. Redish & Marshall, supra note 62, at 476.
87. Equality and impartialityare, of course, different notions. Ajudge acting free from bias
or other partiality can still treat people unequally without adequate grounds. Both concepts
have their own unique complexities. See Roger Crisp, First Among Equals, LONDON TIMES, June
24, 1994, (Literary Supp.) at 12 (reviewing LARRY S. TEMPKIN, INEQUALrIY (1994), which
discusses complexity of evaluating inequality in society). Nevertheless, impartiality shares strong
ties with the admonition that similarly situated persons must be treated equally.
88. SeeMcCONNELL, supra note 15, atviii (observing that "in graduate school, itwas avirtual
dogma that impartiality is a mark of the moral"); Marcia Baron, Impartiality and Friendship, 101
ETHIcS 836, 837-38 (1991) (describing moral philosophy's traditional ideal that under certain
circumstances impartiality requires that persons not be treated as "special"); see alsoJOHN RAWIS,
A THEORY OFJUSTICE 190 (1971) (averring that moral judgments should be impartial).
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they do not arise in a vacuum, but only in the context of human
relationships.89 These moral sentiments require one to identify with
the object of loyalty or gratitude, rather than others who may
compete for equal attention." Thus, inequality is a touchstone for
loyalty and gratitude: outsiders cannot demand the same treatment
as those claiming loyal attachment or grateful appreciation.9'
Translated to sociology's language, the point is the same: reciprocity
or exchange must have an object. Exchange requires an individual
to single out the recipient of a reciprocal act.92 It is for this reason
that social exchange engenders "feelings of personal obligation,
gratitude, and trust."9
The founding premises of gratitude, loyalty, and reciprocity thus
stand at opposite poles from impartiality. Nevertheless, it does not
necessarily follow that an individual can never accommodate the
commands of each obligation simultaneously. To begin, significant
showings of gratitude, loyalty, and reciprocal acts are not required for
every type of benefit conferred.94 For small gifts and other minimal
benefits, one can dispel the obligations of gratitude and exchange
with a gracious "thank you."95 Nor do binding pangs of loyalty
emerge from such social niceties. For benefits of greater value,
however, a recipient's obligation to reciprocate and demonstrate
loyalty and gratitude becomes a weightier, more "moral" duty.95 A
benefit as valuable and prestigious as a federal judgeship would seem
to fall into this category. For this reason, loyalty, gratitude, and
reciprocity stand as threats to a judge's impartiality.
89. See LADD, supra note 20, at 97 (commenting that relationship or tie is basis for loyalty).
90. See BARON, supra note 35, at 6 (arguing that in some instances there is link between
loyalty to one group and discrimination against those not members of that group); FLETCHER,
supra note 5, at 7 (stating that loyalties receive "partialitie? because relationships create them and
"in the realm of loyalty, inequality reigns"); LADD, supra note 20, at 97 (arguing that one can
only be loyal to specific people, not to humanity in general or other broad principles);
McCoNNELL, supra note 15, at 115 (commenting that gratitude is problematic for impartialists).
91. See FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 8 (maintaining that loyalty demands partiality);
McCoNNELI, supra note 15, at 121-23 (discussing gratitude's effect on impartialists). But cf
BARON, supra note 35, at 26-27 (discussing circumstances under which "loyalty" can be
considered "impartial").
92. Cf. BLAU, supra note 37, at 92 (arguing that even though return exchange sometimes
is not directed at precise entity who initiated exchange, return exchange still does have object).
93. BLAU, supra note 37, at 94; see also ROLOFF, supra note 37, at 16 (stating, in context of
discussing Blau's work, that social exchanges cause certain feelings including "personal
obligation, gratitude, and trust").
94. Cf MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 45 (suggesting that failure to respond properly to
large benefits may amount to disrespect for another, but this is not always true with smaller
benefits).
95. McCoNNELL, supra note 15, at 4, 45.
96. MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 4 (arguing that in cases where significant benefits are
received, morality may require gratitude).
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Once a benefit is significant enough to trigger a "moral" duty,
philosophical principles and social norms do not always require the
return of an equally valuable benefit.9 7  As George Simmel has
observed, equality is often impossible, as a theoretical matter, because
a true gift is an "irredeemable obligation."9 8 Gratitude and loyalty
cannot always serve as equal substitutes because they do not have the
spontaneity of the benefactor's initial gesture.9 9 Moreover, as is the
case with a federal judgeship, it is often impossible as a practical
matter to provide a truly "equal" benefit to the benefactor.100 Nor
does an "equal" benefit necessarily take into account the needs of the
benefactor, an idea frequently cited as important to discharging a
debt of gratitude.101
Significantly, certain types of roughly "equal" return benefits may
also be inappropriate. Take, for example, a federal judge who overtly
treats a nomination and confirmation as a gain that contractually
obligates a return in the form of money or other tangible assets.
Such crass behavior is so dearly at odds with the structure of our
constitutional scheme as to fail as an expression of gratitude and
loyalty."0 2 A federal judge thus does not incur any social obligation
to return anything resembling an "equal" benefit to the entities most
responsible for the job. The question thus becomes: What return
obligations does a judge incur?
One possible answer distinguishes between duties to feel a certain
way and duties to take certain actions in acknowledging receipt of the
judgeship. As one philosopher explained: "One can be 'ungrateful'
if one fails to feel certain things like feelings of gratitude, or one can
be 'ungrateful' if one fails in certain outward performances (even if I
97. See HENRY SIDGWIGK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 260-61 (7th ed. 1962) (observing lack of
"clear accepted principle" for identifying "equal return" for benefit). Sociologist Alvin Gouldner
comments that:
Whether in fact there is a reciprocity norm specifically requiring that returns for
benefits received be equivalent is an empirical question. So, too, is the problem of
whether such a norm is part of or distinct from a more general norm which simply
requires that one return some (unspecified) benefits to benefactors.
Gouldner, supra note 42, at 171.
98. Simmel, supra note 36, at 393.
99. Simmel, supra note 36, at 393.
100. See MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 49 (arguing that requirement of equal return may
make some debts of gratitude impossible to repay).
101. See MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 50 (citing needs of benefactor in defining duty of
gratitude); SIDGWIK, supra note 97, at 260-61 (arguing that where benefactor demands return
or obviously needs it, it is ungrateful not to make "equal return");Joel Feinberg, Duties, Rights,
& Claims, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 130, 134 (1980) (suggesting that it
is more appropriate to walt until benefactor "needs help" than to rush to "any sort of payment").
102. Cf MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 50 (pointing out that "[o]bsessive concern with
making an equal return may show the benefactor that his gift has 'misfired'").
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feel grateful, my failure to express this gratitude somehow through
action may earn me a charge of 'ingratitude')."1"3
Analyzing the dichotomy between feeling and action in light of a
judge's impartiality obligations, one might argue that the duty of
impartiality forgives the judge from making "outward performances."
Accordingly, the judge bears only the obligation to harbor sincere
appreciation for her benefactors. This distinction tracks legal
doctrine, which vehemently condemns outward manifestations of
possible partiality by judges.0 4 In fact, both statutory and case law
show a marked preoccupation with avoiding a public perception of
bias.'0 5 Perhaps society can accommodate the doctrine's concern
with avoiding the appearance of bias by allowing the judge to forego
the obligation of making visible expressions of gratitude and loyalty.
Unfortunately, this argument is flawed because it assumes that
"feelings" of gratitude and loyalty make no mark on a judge's
decisionmaking. As is probed more deeply in Part IV, subte (and
sometimes unconscious) social and psychological forces have an
important influence on judicial decisionmaking."' 6 If the duty of
impartiality is to have meaning, it should not exempt from its
proscription matters capable of creating significant prejudice in
decisionmaking. The dichotomy between feeling and action thus
does not provide an easy solution to the impartiality puzzle.
2. Impartiality as the trump card
To this point in the analysis, general moral principles have not
103. SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 166; see also Roslyn Weiss, The Moral and Social Dimension of
Gratitude, 23 SO.J. PHIL 491, 491 (1985) (positing that moral component of gratitude requires
only grateful feeling toward one's benefactor, and obligation to express gratitude through action
is merely social obligation).
104. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text. See generally Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias
and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of FederalJudges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662,
663 (1985) (arguing that fundamental purpose of judicial disqualification is to ensure confi-
dence in judicial integrity).
105. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1154 (1994) (arguing that key to
judicial disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), is appearance of bias); Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988) (discussingjudges' obligation to act in ways
that maintain public confidence injudiciary's impartiality); In reDrexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,
861 F.2d 1307, 1321 (2d Cir. 1988) (setting standard that "[w]henever any reasonable basis to
doubt ajudge's impartiality exists, this public trust demands that we act swiftly and decisively"),
cert. denied 490 U.S. 1102 (1989); Bradshaw v. McCotter, 785 F.2d 1327, 1329 (5th Cir. 1986)
(suggesting that judge should have disqualified himself because public could view judge's acts
as lacking impartiality); see also Leslie W. Abramson, Spedfying GroundsforJudicialDisqualfication
in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1046, 1050-51 (1993) (urging increased legislative concern for
judicial relationships or interests that produce appearance of partiality).
106. See infranotes 226-42 and accompanying text (discussing impact of various factors upon
judicial decisions). See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 80, at 247-49 (describing belief that
emotional and other unconscious drives influence decisionmaking).
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resolved the impartiality dilemma for federaljudges. Another possible
solution to the judge's conflict suggests that impartiality may be a
"superior" or more weighty obligation than gratitude or loyalty 07
If so, the obligation to act impartially may preempt loyalty and
gratitude, eliminating the judge's obligation to be grateful or loyal to
the benefactor." 8 Under the rubric of role morality, a judge
assuming the judicial role could possibly dispense with the otherwise
applicable moral standards of loyalty and gratitude.109 The work of
a number of philosophers and sociologists affirm this conclusion.' 0
Philosophers are engaged in a debate between "impartialists," who
believe that impartiality is essential to the moral justification for an
action, and "personalists," who deny that morality requires a person
to vindicate all actions by reference to impartiality."' In their
charge against impartialists, personalists often draw on the importance
of personal relationships, friendship, and love."'
The impartialist presumably finds the dilemma for a federal judge
easy to resolve, with a clear moral victory for the duty of impartiality.
More interestingly, those who take a more personalist orientation agree
with this conclusion; in unequivocal, albeit somewhat conclusory
statements, many challengers to impartiality theory cite judicial
107. See McCONNELL, supra note 15, at 117 (describing impartialist doctrine disallowing
favored treatment only "because of personal preference").
108. See infta notes 134-36 and accompanying text (suggesting possibility forjudge to navigate
out of dilemma in some situations and repay any debt of gratitude merely by being impartial).
109. See, e.g., RichardWasserstrom, Roles and Morality, inTHE GOOD LAWYER 25 (David Luban
ed., 1983) (describing role morality as "explaining that the role constitutes a sufficient reason
for doing or not doing something that would otherwise be objectionable"). See generalyJOHN
T. NOONAN, JL, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 21 (1976) (discussing interplay between role
and self forjudges). Noonan comments that:
It may be that the role becomes a mask whenever the purpose of serving others is
forgotten; the judge who has forgotten the purpose ofjustice is almost surely masked.
Roles are as necessary for the display of human love as clothes for the display of
human beauty. The naked individual rises to the communal expectations invested in
the role-black-robed on a bench, he is different from the bureaucrat behind a desk.
No more than clothes does a role obscure the human visage. But as a hat can be
pulled down to cover a face, so a role, misused, becomes a mask obliterating the
countenance of humanity.
Id.
110. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM, AND MORALITY 46-47 (1980)
(discussing role impartiality has in judge's duty); Baron, supra note 89, at 836 (arguing that
impartiality's value is not overrated); cf Everett C. Hughes, Wor and the Self in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS 313, 322-23 (John H. Kohrer & Muzafir Sharif eds., 1951)
(discussing various professions' desire to recede from public attention).
111. See McCONNE LL, supranote 15, at 114-47 (describing debate between "impartialists" and
"personalists").
112. See BLUM, supra note 110, at 43-44 (1980) (explaining virtue of friendship); Stephen
L Darwall, Two Kinds of Repect; 88 ETHICS 3649 (1986) (explaining how friendship provides
reason for rejecting impartiaist morality).
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decisionmaking as one context where impartiality should reign."'
One rationale explains the ease with which personalists conclude
that a judge's impartiality should preempt loyalty and gratitude.
While personalists generally herald the value of personal relationships,
some also acknowledge that certain role-related obligations require
individuals within institutions to suspend their personal attach-
ments."4 Ajudge accepting a position is embracing an institutional
role to aspire toward decisionmaking free from bias and agrees to cast
aside any conflicting noninstitutional duties (including obligations of
loyalty and gratitude toward benefactors)., 5 Accordingly, the act of
accepting ajudgeship and its institutional responsibilities excuses the
judge from a moral obligation to indulge the conflicting noninstitu-
tional duties of loyalty and gratitude."' Moreover, the clarity of
instructions accompanying the judge's role in turn diminishes any
residual "pangs" of loyalty and gratitude.
An alternative resolution to the impartiality dilemma may come
from utilitarianism: one may conclude that more social good flows
from allowing impartiality to "win" over loyalty and gratitude in
judicial decisionmaking.1 7  Impartiality is indispensable to our
113. See, e.g., BLUM, supra note 110, at 47-50 (citing judging as unusual circumstance where
impartiality is moral requirement); Baron, supra note 88, at 837 (stating that even critics of
impartiality admit that some circumstances, such as judging, still require impartiality).
114. See BLUM, supra note 110, at 47 (listing examples of professions requiring impartiality
due to role); Alan Gewirth, Ethical Universalism and Particularism, 85J. PHIL 283, 293-94 (1988)
(indicating that family members must be impartial once certain roles are accepted).
115. This argument originated in Terrance McConnell's very helpful critique of the
personalist analysis of gratitude. McCONNELL, supra note 15, at 114-47. The Lord ChiefJustice
in HENRY IV provides an eloquent example of spuming loyalty toward a benefactor in favor of
the institutional duties of impartiality:
[W]hat I did, I did in honour,
Led by th' impartial conduct of my soul,
And never shall you see that I will beg
A ragged and forestall'd remission.
I then did use the person of your father.
The image of his power lay then in me.
And, in th' administration of his law,
Whiles I was busy for the commonwealth,
Your Highness pleased to forget my place,
The majesty and power of law and justice,
The image of the King whom I presented,
And struck me in my very seat ofjudgment;
Whereon, as an offender to your father,
I gave bold way to my authority
And did commit you.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY IV act 5, sc. 2.
116. But see infira Part II.B.3 (discussing difficulties with this line of argument as applied to
federal judges).
117. Cf JAN NARVESON, MORALiY AND UTILrTy 77-81 (1967) (arguing that gratitude is not
moral obligation in utilitarianism).
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vision of even-handed justice within the federal court system." 8
From this premise, one may argue the symbolic and systemic damage
of endorsing exceptions to the impartiality ideal outweighs the social
benefit of allowing individuals to use their judicial office to express
loyalty and gratitude119
Several studies of the sociology of exchange echo the philosophical
consensus that impartiality preempts loyalty and gratitude for a
federal judge. 2 ° In a relatively early study, Everett Cherrington
Hughes documented the tendency of individuals in certain profes-
sions to spurn social exchange and withdraw from others interested
in their work.12" ' Analyzing jazz musicians, physicians, and others,
Hughes observed that members of these professions maintained "a
certain freedom and social distance from [the] people most crucially
and intimately concerned with [their] work."'22 Based on the
specific demands of the professions, Hughes developed functional
explanations for these exceptions to the reciprocity norm. 23
Certainly, the expectation that federal judges recede from public life
and limit private associations fits neatly into Hughes' model of
occupations demanding professional detachment. As such, Hughes'
work helps explain the practice of allowing federal judges to withhold
the gratitude and loyalty normally expected under principles of social
exchange.
Drawing on the work of Hughes and others, sociologist Alvin
Gouldner developed a more general model for defining exceptions
to the norm of social exchange. 24 Gouldner suggested that the
norm is most easily suspended when society develops formal mecha-
118. Cf BLUM, supra note 110, at47 (indicating need for impartialjustice); supranotes 62-77
and accompanying text (setting out doctrines ostensibly requiring judicial neutrality).
119. The symbolic importance of impartiality is well reflected in the legal doctrine. For
example, this doctrine shows strong commitments to generating faith in our system of
government and to the belief that resort to the judicial process will result injustice. SeeJoint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(observing that "so important to a popular government" is sentiment "that justice has been
done").
120. See Gouldner, supra note 39, at 250; Hughes, supra note 110, at 313.
121. Hughes, supra note 110, at 322.
122. Hughes, supra note 110, at322.
123. Hughes observed that musicians are inclined to withdraw from their audiences.
Although audiences are essential to a musician's livelihood, Hughes explained that musicians
tend to dismiss their audience as unable to properly judge their work. To avoid "ego-wound"
and "antagonism," musicians may therefore decline to return their audiences attentions.
Hughes, supra note 110, at 322.
For physicians and others involved in emergency treatment, Hughes documented the
inclination to dismiss patient attention and concern. Hughes suggests that this phenomenon
is either part of the medical worker's coping mechanism, or the result of the worker's belief
(grounded in experience) that the patient is exaggerating her troubles. Id. at 322-23.
124. Gouldner, supra note 39, at 250.
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nisms that compensate for a lack of reciprocity. In other words, our
society develops explicit cultural prohibitions against strict reciprocity
in order to exempt certain circumstances from the norm of social
exchange.'2
The duty of impartiality arguably acts as such a prohibition,
establishing judicial decisionmaking as a circumstance where a
beneficiary should not strive for strict reciprocity. Indeed, our
governmental institutions and political heritage instruct a federal
judge to suspend ordinary rules of social exchange in adjudicating
cases. For the judge, our society expresses a clear message: personal
matters are off-limits in the decisionmaking process.
Symbolic elements of our rituals reinforce this message, strengthen-
ing the command of impartiality and detachment: we dress our
judges in black robes; we place them behind a bench (frequently
elevating them higher than the parties); we refer to them as 'Your
Honor"; we isolate their chambers within courthouses; and we respect
the secrecy of judicial deliberations. For federal judges, the symbol-
ism is further sustained by the oath of office itself,12 as well as the
(well-debated) notion that federal judges are more capable than their
state counterparts to apply federal law without bias. 127 Like Hughes,
Gouldner therefore provides a framework for understanding how a
federal judge may be excused from any obligation toward the judge's
benefactor.1
28
125. Gouldner, supra note 39, at 250.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (Supp. V 1993). The oath includes thejudge's promise of impartiality.
I ... do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me ... under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.
Id.
127. See generauy Erwin Chemerinsky, Pariy Reconsidered: Defining a Rolefor the FederalJudicimay,
36 UCLA L REv. 233 (1988) (commenting on federaljudicial "superiority" debate, and arguing
that litigants should be able to use state courts for federal constitutional claims); Burt Neuborne,
The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L REV. 1105 (1977) (discussing debate over "superiority" of federal
judiciary).
For the historical roots of this notion, see The Federalist No. 80, at 23 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Roy P. Fairchild ed., 2d ed. 1981) (contending that diversityjurisdiction is necessary because
federal court will be impartial in such cases, and "will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious
to the principles on which [the Unionj is founded"), and id. No. 81, at 24 (arguing that state
judges' lack of true independence will prevent them from impartially applying federal law).
128. Similarly, sociologist Peter Blau has produced significant work on exceptions to the
reciprocity norm. SeeJACK N. MITCHELL, SOCIAL EXCHANGE, DRAMATURGY AND ETHNOMETHO-
DOLOY 63-66 (1978) (describing Blau's contribution to social exchange theory). According to
Blau, there are some benefits that are so valuable and unilateral that they can only be repaid
with some form of social deference, such as granting esteem or acknowledgment of status or
power. BLAU, supra note 37, at 21-22. Blau's analysis of power and unilateral acts is certainly
helpful in understanding a federal judge's relationship with his or her benefactors. Blau's
analysis is not, however, directly relevant to the struggle between impartiality and the norm of
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In the face of this persuasive sociological analysis-and the
philosophical theories supporting it-I am still uneasy. I do not
challenge the general conclusion that a judge's impartiality duty
overrides moral obligations of loyalty and gratitude. Nor do I dismiss
the suggestion that judging is an occupation largely exempt from
mainstream currents of social exchange. I nevertheless find complexi-
ties calling for closer analysis.
One complexity arises from our institutions for appointing federal
judges. In Part III, I canvass various possible motivations undergird-
ing the selection and appointment process. Where clearly expressed,
these motivations may confuse the judge's institutional duties. Take,
for example, instances where the Executive nominates a judicial
candidate because the candidate's ideological predispositions are in
line with the President's."' As I examine in detail below, the
Executive's ability to act on this motivation is a natural outgrowth of
the politicized confirmation and nomination process. Because the
institutions created under our Constitution empower the Executive to
act on ideological motivations, a judge appointed under these
conditions might reasonably ponder whether there is an institutional
duty, inherent in the position of a judge, to approach decisions with
a sympathetic ear to the Executive's position.' ° If the judge does
bear such a duty, then the clash of impartiality against loyalty and
gratitude is not easily dismissed; the judge's obligations to express
loyalty and gratitude through decisionmaking may be as integral to
the judge's institutional role as the impartiality duty."'
Notwithstanding this observation, the notion that our constitutional
structure imposes an institutional obligation on federal judges to
execute their duties consistently with the President's wishes is a flawed
one. Screening procedures (combined with a measure of good
fortune), rather thanjudicial duty under the Constitution, account for
Presidents who "get what they want" from the judges they appoint.
After all, our Constitution does not envision a judiciary accountable
reciprocity.
129. For the purposes of this Article, I treat ajudge's ideology or ideological predispositions
as equivalent to the judge's "opinions about the law and public policy that are rooted in the
general experience of living," Richard D. Manoloff, TheAdvice and Consent of the Congress: Toward
a Supreme Court Appointment Processfor Our Time, 54 OHIO ST. LJ. 1087,1087-88 n.6 (1993) (citing
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 14-18, 113-15 (1921)). Ideology
and ideological predispositions are therefore somewhat distinct from judicial philosophy and
theories ofjudging. Id.
130. See infra Part III.B.1.
131. See MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 138-40 (explaining how clashes between impartiality
and gratitude are easier to resolve where impartiality is institutional role-related obligation and
gratitude is non-institutional obligation).
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to the other branches of government. 3 2 To the contrary, indepen-
dence is the hallmark of our federal courts.
What is not so easy to dismiss, however, is the psychological and
emotional effect of the nomination and confirmation procedures on
federal judges. Where the Executive makes plain that the judge was
chosen for her ideological predispositions, the nominee is at least
more likely to feel pressure to make decisions consistent with the
Executive's position. Similarly, in instances where the Executive
nominates a judge as a reward for past political service, the judge is
also likely to feel the strong tug of loyalty and gratitude. Indeed, the
social exchange process made possible the judge's nomination. She
may well hesitate before spurning gratitude and loyalty, as both are
integral parts of the process that made possible her life's work.'33
Many of our traditions struggle to maintain impartiality as the
overriding principle for the judge, while other parts of our system
work to undermine this message. Our history and doctrines say
clearly that impartiality is paramount. Yet, our institutions send
mixed messages. The above examples illustrate that the nomination
and confirmation process may inject into a judge's decisionmaking
personal feelings of obligation toward her benefactor. These feelings
may undermine the apparent clarity of the impartiality ethic heralded
in our legal tradition and doctrine.
3. Nonjudicial outlets for exchange
Thus far, this Article has described a "clash" between the duty of
impartiality and the expectations of gratitude, loyalty, and exchange.
This clash emerges and becomes significant where the judge can
satisfy gratitude, loyalty, and exchange expectations only by compro-
mising the judge's impartiality. If the judge can find a nonjudicial
outlet to express her appreciation, her sacrifice of impartiality is
minimized. Moreover, eliminating any obligation to express loyalty
and gratitude in rendering decisions can not only allow her to move
closer to the impartiality ideal, but may also significantly reduce
dissonance for the judge. In other words, the judge may comfortably
exclude loyalty and gratitude from her decisionmaking because she
is able to satisfy her moral and social obligations through such acts as
132. The Constitution is not without contradiction on this score. After all, the Executive's
power to appoint would be of considerably diminished consequence if we did not assume that
some of the nominees willingly served the appointing President's ideological and political
agenda. SeeManoloff, supra note 129, at 1098 (finding that appointment of ideologically similar
Supreme Court justices may extend President's political agenda beyond term in office).
133. See, e.g., supra notes 1, 6, 37-38, 56, 60 and accompanying text.
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buying dinner for her benefactor or donating a kidney to save her
benefactor's life. If accurate, this proposed solution would be useful
both in resolving any moral conflict of impartiality, loyalty, and
gratitude, and in dispelling the judge's emotional and psychological
discomfort from her perception of conflicting duties.
The proposed resolution is promising; neither moral principles nor
social norms necessarily mandate that gratitude and loyalty be
expressed in the same context, or concern the same subject matter,
as the forces that gave rise to them.134 More specifically, in the
language of philosophy, gratitude and loyalty are most easily classified
as "imperfect duties." That is, they are obligations to take action
consistent with guiding principles rather than duties to perform a
certain act."' Their status as imperfect duties allows a judge
substantial moral latitude in choosing the manner in which she
satisfies them. For that reason, a nonjudicial outlet may be an
entirely appropriate avenue for fulfilling her loyalty and gratitude
obligations."'5
Despite its promise, the proposed solution has problems. To begin,
the type of nonjudicial expression adequate to reciprocate for a
federal judgeship is apt to be so significant as to draw the judge into
a close web of exchange or intimacy with her benefactor.137 Be-
134. See SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 167-68 (stating that obligations of gratitude are less
"content-specific" than obligations to honor promise or contract).
135. McCONNELL, supra note 15, at 67-68 (noting difference between "imperfect" and
"perfect duties" and required corresponding actions for each); SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 167-68
(discussing obligations that attach to debts of gratitude). Professor Terrance McConnell
explains the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties:
Imperfect duties differ from perfect duties in that only the former are, among other
things, duties to adopt a maxim and to promote a prescribed end. Perfect duties
require only the right sorts of acts. If there is a perfect duty to keep one's promises,
an agent fulfills this duty by doing as he promised, regardless of whether he adopts a
principle to that effect .... In giving us imperfect duties, the moral law prescribes
directly only maxims of actions; it directs us to adopt certain guiding principles, to take
to heart certain principles.
McCoNNELL, supra note 15, at 67.
136. Nor is the resolution without foundation in history. A striking example is the continued
loyalty and advice (on nonjudicial matters) that Abe Fortas extended to President Johnson
during Fortas' service as ajustice. See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS 293 (1990) ("As a colleague
on the Court said, for most of his tenure as a justice, 'Abe was sitting in Lyndon Johnson's
lap.'").
137. See GEORGE C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 55 (1961) ("The
more valuable to a man a unit of the activity another gives him, the more often he will emit
activity rewarded by the activity of the other."); KANT, supra note 8, at 249 (asserting that
"intensity of gratitude... is to be assessed by how useful the favor was to the one put under
obligation and how unselfishly it was bestowed on him"); MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 61
(maintaining that to discharge obligation of gratitude, one must provide benefactor with
"commensurate" benefit if suitable occasion arises); SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 169 (indicating
that value of benefit to benefited is relevant minimally to "the content of the debt of gratitude,
if not to its generation"); see also Simmel, supra note 36, at 387 (explaining that gratitude
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cause the web of exchange or intimacy will generate further loyalty
and gratitude obligations, impartiality may continue to suffer, even
though the judge is initially excused from expressing appreciation
through her decisionmaking.
The judge may navigate her way out of the exchange web by
concluding that the "greater" duty of impartiality excuses her from
reciprocating at all. But, again, this does not relieve the judge of all
tensions. Even though the judge may find relief from a moral or
social duty to express loyalty and gratitude, several factors will likely
continue psychological and emotional pressure for the judge to
reciprocate through her decisionmaking. These forces are, of course,
strongest when moral theory and social norms come closest to
imposing a "duty" on the federal judge.
One strong pressure derives from the potential of gratitude and
loyalty to create more than affirmative obligations. Indeed, gratitude
and loyalty may also include negative proscriptions against taking
action contrary to the benefactor's interests. As a matter of general
moral theory, gratitude and loyalty may require an individual to avoid
actions at odds with the strong preferences of her benefactor. If
applied to a federal judge, this obligation would require the judge to
act consistently with her benefactor's desires when confronted with a
case or issue for which the benefactor has expressed a deeply held
position. Were the judge to act otherwise-the argument goes-she
would miss a fitting opportunity to repay her debt to the benefac-
tor.
138
While this line of moral reasoning quite possibly does not govern
a federal judge subject to the institutional duty of impartiality,139 its
force in other aspects of life may affect the judge's work. Indeed,
where a benefactor holds strong beliefs about a case, the benefactor
would probably perceive a judge's ruling adverse to the benefactor's
preference as unacceptably disloyal and ungrateful. This perception
is most likely to arise when nonjudicial expressions of gratitude do
not even come close to satisfying the benefactor's needs and
establishes bonds of interaction among individuals through reciprocity of service and return
service). But cf. WILLIAM L. SKIDMORE, SOCIOLOGY'S MODELS OF MAN 23-24 (1975) (critiquing
Homans' work on issue of"success proposition" theory, where rewards lose value with increased
frequency of receipt).
138. See MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 69-70 (discussing Mill's discussion of "imperfect
duties" (citing FRED BERGER, HAPPINESS, JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OFJOHN STUART MILL 220 (1984))).
139. See supra notes 107-28 and accompanying text (exploring duty of impartiality and its
possible superiority over loyalty and gratitude).
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expectations."4° Take for example the judge who was appointed
solely because the Executive believed they shared the same ideological
predispositions. Surely this judge would disappoint the Executive by
ruling contrary to this "predisposition"-even if the judge found
another, nonjudicial way of expressing her appreciation.' For this
judge and others like her, it is unlikely that the duty of impartiality
can act as an impenetrable shield against all forces of loyalty and
gratitude.
The specter of a benefactor's indignation is likely to affect the
judge's performance. After all, reciprocity, gratitude, and loyalty
permeate our society, serving not only as social norms but as moral
guidelines as well. Given their presence in nearly all aspects of a
judge's life, it is unreasonable to expect ajudge to purge them wholly
upon donning a black robe. Gratitude, loyalty, and social exchange
are the fruit of a complex net of human relationships, the content of
the "historical self"4 2 from which a judge cannot-and should
not-divorce herself upon taking the bench.
One final (and unlikely) factor may contribute to ajudge's inability
to guard herself from loyalty and gratitude in decisionmaking: our
tradition of judicial independence. This tradition-designed to
140. See SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 168 (arguing that requirements of obligation and
gratitude depend on needs of original benefactor and position of original beneficiary).
141. Note, however, that the duties of gratitude and loyalty may be reduced in this situation
because the motivation of the beneficiary is arguably self-interested. See infra notes 192-96 and
accompanying text (discussing effects of beneficiary's selfish motives). Perhaps the most famous
modem example of "the disappointed Executive" is Eisenhower, who-in answer to the question
whether he had made any mistakes as President-responded: "Yes, two, and they are both
sitting on the Supreme Court." Eisenhower was referring to Earl Warren and William Brennan.
HENRYJ. ABRAHAM,JUSTICEs AND PRESIDENTS 266-67 (3d ed. 1992). Another example concerns
Roosevelt's appointment of the firstJustice Holmes. By refusing to declare that a major railroad
merger violated the Sherman Antitrust Act in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197 (1904), the newly appointed Justice reportedly "turn [ed] on his benefactor, demonstrating
what the President is said later to have called all the backbone of a banana." THOMAS D.
MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIAS ON MODERN ANTnTRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS 80 (1994) (citation
omitted); see also ERNEST GEU.IORN & WILLIAM E. KovAcic, ANTITRusT LAW AND ECONOMICS IN
A NUTSHELL 26 n.26 (noting Holmes' supposed reply "Some bananal Some backbonel").
142. FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 16-21 (describing development and obligations of "historical
self").
143. See RICHARDJ. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIISM AND RELATIVISM 129 (1983) (stating that
humans must constantly fight and compensate for inherent and inescapable prejudices that
"'constitute our being'" (quoting H. GADAMAR, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (1976)));
Leubsdorf, supra note 80, at 237-38 (arguing that it is naive to believe that judges can escape
their "prepossessions").
Scholars have also discussed whether ajudge should attempt to cut ties with their roots and
their communities upon taking the bench. See FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 163 (indicating that
"[c]larifying the realms of loyalty and ofjustice" requires judicial appreciation of past personal
relationships and impartiality); Resnick, supra note 66, at 1922 (articulating how deficiency exists
with respect to valuing love, care, and interdependency in context of judicial notions of
impartiality and detachment).
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isolate judges from the "political" arena -- may actually nourish
feelings of loyalty and gratitude. Once the seeds of gratitude and
loyalty are planted during nomination and confirmation, they are
allowed to endure, largely unchecked by political pressures. Although
empirical evidence suggests that judges feel less allegiance to their
benefactors as time passes," a judge's isolation may initially allow
such sentiments to flourish. Such a result is ironic, since the federal
judiciary's insulation from politics is itself often touted as promoting
impartiality"
Nonjudicial outlets for gratitude and loyalty thus do not provide a
clean escape from the impartiality dilemma. While we may reasonably
conclude that a judge is excused from a formal social and moral
obligation to reciprocate to her benefactor, judges are subject to
strong contrary emotional and psychological messages. From the
foregoing discussion, these messages are most problematic in
circumstances where pangs of loyalty, gratitude, and reciprocity urge
a judge disposing of cases to consider the interests of her benefactor.
The following discussion scrutinizes the nomination and confirmation
process and the various motivations behind judicial appointments in
order to pinpoint more accurately when this problem is most likely to
arise.
III. NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION
The Appointments Clause provides that the President "shall
144. Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEASr DANGEROUS BRANCH 68-72 (2d ed. 1986)
(suggesting thatjudicial isolation from politics allowsjudges latitude in forming decisions); Alan
Hirsch, Candor and Prudence in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 858,864 (1993)
(book review) (discussing Bickel's "prudentialist" approach to judiciary, in which built-injudicial
isolation allows judges "to inject principles into a national discourse usually driven by self-interest
and expediency").
145. A number of observers have pointed to instances when Supreme Court justices
apparently became more autonomous as they spend more time in their position. See, e.g.,
ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 195-98 (discussing Justice Harlan F. Stone's transformation from
pro-business conservative to champion of individual rights); Bernard Schwartz, TlMJudicial Lives
of Earl Warren, 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1981) (describing President Eisenhower's
dissatisfaction with his selection of Chief Justice Earl Warren); David 0. Stewart, White to the
Right?, NBA. J.,July 1990, at 40 (analyzing conservative position thatJustice White assumed over
time); Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1983)
(cataloguing Justice Blackmun's migration across ideological spectrum of Court).
146. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 n.10
(1982) (finding that good behavior and life tenure clauses in Article III promote judicial
independence and insulate judiciary from improper influences of both other branches and
colleagues); Irving K. Kaufman, ChillingJudicial Independence 88 YALE LJ. 681, 684 (1979)
(observing that "impartiality demands freedom from political pressure").
In making this argument, I do not deny that the strength of the impartiality duty and the
accompanying pressures of assuming the judicial role can at least partially cancel out pangs of
loyalty and gratitude.
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nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States." 47 Although the precise meaning of this
provision is much debated," all agree that it governs the nomina-
tion and confirmation of Supreme Court justices as well as judges of
the lower federal courts. '49 A review of the process implementing
the Appointments Clause uncovers a number of opportunities for
individuals and groups to influence the selection process.1 50 This
Part will identify these potential benefactors and review potential
criteria they may use in deciding which judicial candidate to promote.
A. Who is the Judge's Benefactor?
1. The President and the Executive Branch
The central dispute over the meaning of the Appointments Clause
147. U.S. CONsr. art. H, § 2.
148. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court
Nominees, 79 YALE J. 657 (1970) (evaluating Senate's role in judicial nomination and
confirmation process); Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146
(1988) (containing essays by Paul A. Freund, Bruce A. Ackerman, Stephen Carter, Henry Paul
Monaghan, and Nina Totenberg that discuss historical views on appointment process and noting
inherent complications in process, such as public's role and relationship between law and
politics); Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARv. L. REv. 672 (1989)
(discussing Supreme Court nomination of Judge Robert Bork and its ultimate failure); Luis
Kutner, Advice and Dissent: Due Process of the Senate, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 658 (1974) (insisting that
Senate play more prominent role injudicial nomination and confirmation process); Charles M.
Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in the Judicial Selection Process,
54 U. CHi. L. REv. 200 (1987) (explaining role and responsibility of Senators in confirmation
process); RogerJ. Miner, Adviceand Consent in Theory and Practice, 41-AM. U. L. REV. 1075 (1992)
(discussing and urging reform of advice and consent process); Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent,
and Influence, 84 NW. U. L REV. 858 (1990) (surveying Senate's role in confirmation process,
focusing primarily on Bork nomination); William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the
Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633 (1987) (arguing that
Senate's multifaceted role in Supreme Court appointment process is crucial to ensuring
confirmation of only competent, qualified justices, necessitating utmost level of senatorial
scrutiny); GaryJ. Simson, Thomas's Supreme Unfitness-A Letter to the Senate on Advise and Consent,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 619 (1993) (condemning Senate's confirmation of Justice Thomas, and
reviewing confirmation process); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution,
and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992) (tracing Senate's role in confirmation
process and making suggestions for its improvement); James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended
Role of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1989) (evaluating why
Senate was chosen by Framers to confirm Court nominees).
149. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1508 n.84 (recognizing that for purposes of
constitutional structure and text, "there is no difference ... between the Supreme Court and
the lower courts").
150. See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Limits ofJudicial Independence, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REv. 57 (1993). Professor Fiss observes:
While the Constitution creates a measure of political insularity for the federal judiciary,
a number of other factors-some also rooted in the Constitution-bring the judiciary
to some extent under the sway of one or the other of the political branches. The first
and most obvious concerns the method of selection.
Id. at 62.
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concerns the proper role of the Senate in judicial selection.
Consistent with the practice followed during the last few administra-
tions,151 most recent §cholarship has embraced an expansive role for
the Senate in executing its "consent" function.'52 Most commenta-
tors no longer urge the Senate to approach its review of nominees
with extreme deference to the Executive. Instead, many urge the
Senate to expand its scrutiny of nominees, and applaud the practice
in recent years of attempting to identify a nominee's jurisprudential
and ideological beliefs.'53
Several scholars have also focused on the Appointment Clause's
reference to senatorial "advice," arguing that the Constitution
envisions a dialogue between the Senate and the Executive at the
nomination stage of the process. 54 Current practice, however, does
not reflect any formal role for the Senate prior to nomination.' 55
151. Historical accounts suggest that in the first century after ratification of the Constitution,
the Senate was even more involved in judicial selection than today. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra
note 141, at 71-155 (reviewing history of Supreme Court appointments from 1789-1829); Henry
P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1202 (1988)
(surveying Senate's various justifications for rejecting Supreme Court nominees, including
nominee's political views, political opposition to incumbent President, desire to hold vacancy
for next President, senatorial courtesy, interest group pressure, and nominee's failure to meet
minimum professional standards).
Although the Senate's role has apparently diminished since the turn of the century, the
practice in the last two decades reflects the general understanding that Senators are under no
constitutional compulsion to defer to the President's choice. See Nagel, supra note 148, at 858
(noting Senate's increasing role and active participation in judicial selection and confirmation
process).
152. See Mathias, supra note 148, at 205 (advocating that Senate dedicate more resources to
enhancing consent role); Monaghan, supra note 151, at 1203 (arguing that Senate's role should
be viewed as "political," so that Senate can serve as "important check on the President's power
to appoint" and reduce "countermajoritarian" difficulties ofjudicial review, which conflict with
ideals of democratic government).
153. See, e.g., Black, supra note 148, at 662 (arguing that Senate should "take into account
anything that they... think to bear on the wisdom of the appointment," including whether
"nominee holds skewed and purblind views on social justice"); Gauch, supra note 148, at 341
(concluding that "if we are to achieve the ends the Framers desired, the Senate must play an
active role in considering not only the basic qualifications of the nominee, but any factors that
it deems important");Judith Resnick, Changing Criteria forJudgingJudge, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 889,
890-96 (1990) (reviewing salutary effects of Senate scrutiny of nominees); Strauss & Sunstein,
supra note 148, at 1494, 1500 (arguing that Senate was intended to test political commitments
of nominees and "should assert rather than abdicate its role as an equal partner in the
appointment process"). But cf Nagel, supra note 148, at 858 (arguing that "screening the beliefs
of nominees may be at odds with the goal of establishing political influence over the Supreme
Court").
154. See, e.g., Kutner, supra note 148, at 663 (arguing that Constitution requires senatorial
consent prior to nomination); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1495-1500 (discussing
constitutional intent that running dialogue occur between Executive and Senate regarding
Supremie Court nominees). But see Simson, supra note 148, at 662 (observing that language of
Appointments Clause undercuts position that President should have to consult with Senate
before nomination).
155. See Black, supra note 148, at 659 (charging that stage of senatorial "advice" has been
"short-circuited" in practice). For lower court judges, the President occasionally pays close
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Instead, the Executive operates largely autonomously in making the
ultimate nomination decision.
Whatever one's viewpoint on the proper role of the Senate in
confirmation, no one denies the paramount power of the Executive
in choosing federal judges.15 It is the Executive who narrows the
field of candidates, sets the agenda, and frames the discourse by
selecting one among scores of possible nominees for a judgeship.
Without the President's decision to put the nominee before the
Senate, she would remain in the sea of hopefuls.
For these reasons, the most likely individual in the Executive
Branch to stand out as the judge's benefactor is the President, who
presumably has not delegated the ultimate nomination decision.
5 7
Of course, other individuals advising the President may take primary
responsibility for initially identifying the nominee and shepherding
the nominee through the confirmation process.15 Indeed, under
current practice, the President's delegates spend long hours with
Supreme Court nominees before and during confirmation hear-
ings.
159
Individual delegates of the President, however, have only limited
prospects of emerging as benefactors of thejudge. Admittedly, to the
attention to the preferences of the Senator for the state where the judicial vacancy is located.
See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1508 n.82 (reiterating need for increased senatorial
participation, despite usual deference accorded by President to Senator of nominee's state).
156. Recent case law, nevertheless, has emphasized the importance of strong executive and
congressional power under the Appointments Clause in preserving a balance of powers. See
Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 765-66 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (contending that
if structural benefits of Appointments Clause are to be preserved, "no Branch may aggrandize
its own appointment power" and "no Branch may abdicate its Appointments Clause duties").
157. See STEPHEN L CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 336 (1994) (arguing that "the cult of
personality in which we foolishly wrap the modem presidency" forces vast appointment power
'on the single individual whom we happen to elect"); Monaghan, supra note 151, at 1206
(noting that "[i]n theory, the President alone can nominate," but in practice, both President
and Senate bear responsibility of ensuring that competent persons fill judgeships).
158. Many advisors are involved in the preparation for the confirmation hearing. SeeStrauss
& Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1492 n.4 (acknowledging long periods of consultation between
nominees andJustice Department officials prior to hearings). In addition, advisors are involved
in the selection process. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Bush'sJudicial Legacy: The Final lmprin 76
JUDICATURE 282, 285 (Apr.-May 1993) (describing initial screening and processing of judicial
candidates under Bush administration); Ann Devroy & Ruth Marcus, After 87 Days, Tortuous
Selection Process CameDown to Karma, WASH. POSTJune 15, 1993, at All (reporting on unusually
long duration and intimate Presidential involvement in process of selecting Ruth Bader Ginsburg
for nomination to Supreme Court); Daniel Klaidman, Ran Klain and the Power to Choose; Precocious
Lawyer Emerges as Clinton's Top Judge-Picte, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1 (discussing
monograph of apparently influential adviser to President Clinton responsible for screening
potential nominees).
159. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1518 n.107 (citing extensive preparation of
Justices Souter and Thomas before confirmation hearings); Neil A. Lewis, A Rehearsed Thomas
is Set for Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1991, at A12 (reporting that Thomas spent summer of
1991 preparing for confirmation hearing with assistance of lawyers sent by White House).
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extent that these delegates are later involved-in their individual
capacities-in litigation before the judge, their role in the selection
process may cast them as benefactors, independent of the President
or the Executive Branch as a whole. Nevertheless, few, if any,
structural reasons suggest that this will occur frequently.
What is quite likely is for the Executive Branch to have an interest
in a case before the judge-either because the Executive or an
Executive agency is a litigant, has taken a policy position on the case
(through the Solicitor General or otherwise), or has a general
institutional interest in a certain outcome. If such is the case,
individual Executive officials responsible for the nomination are not
likely to haunt the judge as benefactors. Rather, the Administration
as a whole rises out as the benefactor, and the President stands as the
symbol most deserving of the judge's loyalty and gratitude.
2. The Senate and individual Senators
Although its role in scrutinizing nominees sometimes determines
the fate of a judicial candidate, the Senate-as a body-is not a likely
benefactor. First of all, the Senate's role-at least in the last
century-is largely confined to veto power over a candidate.'
Because this power is negative only, the Senate as a whole is not a
motivating force behind nominations. The Senate lacks responsibility
for sponsoring particular nominees and therefore is unlikely to
ingratiate itself to ajudge. Of course, where a nominee is ultimately
successful after a heated confirmation battle, individual Senators or
groups of Senators may become champions of the nominee. The fact
that battles occur within the Senate, however, casts doubt on the
proposition that feelings of gratitude, loyalty, or reciprocity exist
between the nominee and the Senate as an institution.
Given the negative nature of its power, the Senate is not predis-
posed to use that power often. 61  Despite celebrated cases in the
last several decades, the Senate has not shown a consistent practice of
using the resources and political capital necessary to engage in
searching review of all nominees to the federal bench.'62
160. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text. A possible exception isJustice Cardozo,
whom Hoover arguably nominated in order to satisfy rumblings from the Senate. ABRAHAM,
supra note 141, at 205-06.
161. For reasons of proficiency and resource limitations, the Senate barely uses that power
at all for lower courtjudges. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1507-09 (arguing that
because "Senate is essentially unable to affect the composition of the lower courts," it should
play larger role in selection of Supreme CourtJustices).
162. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 76, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(reasoning that presidential nominations are seldom rejected by Senate for reasons of senatorial
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This discussion suggests another possible source for the Senate's
lack of promise as a benefactor: loyalty and gratitude obligations may
not even extend toward a collectivity such as the Senate. Many
observers have found no limitation on institutional loyalty and
gratitude.163 Others, however, have argued that any duty of institu-
tional loyalty and gratitude is minimal or nonexistent, especially where
the institution tolerates and fosters disagreement among its mem-
bers."6  This position is particularly compelling in analyzing the
favoritism, given that there is no assurance that preferable candidate would subsequently be
nominated); Monaghan, supra note 151, at 1209-10 (reiterating "institutionally important point
... that it takes enormous energy for senators to unite in order to resist the President [on a
consistent basis] .... [T]he hard fact is that the President's vision of what is proper judicial
philosophy ultimately will prevail .... ").
Nina Totenberg explains the disinclination of Senators to make objections during
confirmation:
To be sure, most senators would rather not spend their time and political capital on
an arduous confirmation process. It is a politically risky business. Controversial issues
are likely to be stirred up. A confirmation battle can only create new enemies back
home. And what does the politician get for his trouble? Nothing concrete. No
legislation. No campaign money. Maybe he'll satisfy some of his supporters, but he'll
infuriate others. At rock bottom, all a senator gets out of the confirmation process,
if it turns controversial, is one's personal satisfaction that comes from doing what he
thinks is right.
Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1213, 1213-14 (1988).
163. See, e.g., RICHARD KRAuT, SOCRATES AND THE STATE 148 (1984) (finding support for
institutional gratitude in observation that people owe all kinds of debts, such as financial ones,
to institutions); MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 193-98 (arguing that while gratitude to institution
may seem peculiar, "nothing in principle rules out the possibility"); A.D.M. Walker, Political
Obligation and the Argument from Gratitude, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 191, 197-98 (1988) (finding
support for institutional gratitude in observation that pupils and patients may show obligation
to institutions that received them); see also FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 33-36 (asserting that
people are not loyal to entirely impersonal organizations but instead show their loyalty to other
people within those organizations); Oldenquist, supra note 8, at 176 (arguing that group loyalists
"can share noninstrumental goods, such as a nation, a family, a neighborhood, or a philosophy
department, and therefore can constitute a moral community"). But cf. ROYCE, supra note 23,
at 20 ("[T]he cause to which a loyal man is devoted is never something wholly impersonal. It
concerns other men. Loyalty is social.").
164. See ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs 53 (1980)
(indicating that debts of gratitude are owed to individuals, not institutions). Philosopher A.
John Simmons explains this position:
Where a group of persons is concerned, there is very seldom anything like a reason,
common to all of them, for which the benefit was provided. Some members of a
group may have worked against providing the benefits, others may have wanted to
provide the benefits only to enhance their own positions, and so on. Because of this,
it is difficult to know what to say about benefits provided for an individual by a group.
But in the case of institutions, the problem is far worse; for institutions are manifestly
not complex groups of persons .... But I suspect that the temptation to believe [in
gratitude toward institutions] rests on thinking of the institution as a group of people,
or thinking of particular people whose effort and generosity made benefits obtained
from these institutions possible. To be sure, individuals do fill positions within the
structures of institutions. But these positions have functions and the individuals filling
them have "positional duties" related to these functions. Insofar as individuals who
make these benefits possible are merely "doing their job," considerations of gratitude
do not enter the picture at all.
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Senate, which provides many legitimate avenues during the confirma-
tion process for its members to fight against a judge's confirmation.
From this point of view, the individual who ultimately receives the
judgeship will not view the Senate as a body unified behind her. She
is therefore apt to direct her loyalty and gratitude away from the
institution and toward specific Senators.
The final factor bearing on the Senate's status as a benefactor is the
likelihood that the Senate may never have a significant interest in
litigation pending before thejudge. It is possible for the Senate itself
or its Secretary to be a litigant in a case before the judge, particularly
in litigation challenging the legitimacy of legislation. 65 Federal
statutes make it especially easy for the Office of Senate Legal Counsel
to intervene as a party or as amicus curiae in cases in which the
Senate's constitutional powers or responsibilities are placed in
issue. '6 In addition, even where the Senate is not formally in-
volved, litigation occasionally implicates the Senate's institutional
interests, such as cases concerning separation of powers and the
constitutional prerogatives enjoyed by the Senate.
Yet, litigation concerning the Senate is surely far less frequent than
instances where litigation involves or implicates the interests of the
Executive Branch. After all, the Executive Branch includes the Justice
Department itself, which is constantly litigating on behalf of the
President and administrative agencies. Thus, even assuming that the
Senate, as an institution, is poised to gather significant debts of loyalty
and gratitude from federal judges, it is less frequently in a position to
take advantage of those debts.
In contrast to the Senate as a whole, individual Senators have many
opportunities to attract the gratitude and loyalty of federaljudges. As
already mentioned, individual Senators may emerge as champions of
SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 188.
165. See, e.g., Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,714 (1986) (describing process whereby Senate,
as institution, intervened as defendant in challenge to constitutionality of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollins Act); INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983) (involving Senate as party in suit
challenging constitutionality of procedures under Immigration and Nationality Act); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 (1976) (involving Secretary of United States Senate, in official capacity, as
defendant in constitutional challenge to Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971); Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (deciding suit challenging President's "pocket-veto"
to legislation, in which Senate intervened in order "to protect a direct interest in the efficacy
of its legislative action"), vacated sub noam. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 362-65 (1987).
It is also possible that the Senate may be a party to litigation challenging the conduct of the
institution or individual members. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 created a process
whereby employment-related complaints of Senate employees may eventually end up in the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. See 2 U.S.C. § 1209(a) (1988).
166. 2 U.S.C. §§ 288e, 288L
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a judicial nominee during heated confirmation battles.16 7
Perhaps more significant, however, are the traditions of senatorial
sponsorship for Supreme Court justices and senatorial courtesy for
lower court judges. "Senatorial sponsorship" in this context means
the occasional practice of allowing one Senator to stand as the
nominee's patron throughout nomination and confirmation.'6
"Senatorial courtesy" refers to the custom of ensuring home-state
Senators veto power overjudicial appointments. Through established
tradition, the Senate has extended this "courtesy" through the "blue
slip procedure," by which the Senate Judiciary Committee invites
Senators of the nominee's state to comment on the nomination.169
When a Senator does not return the "blue slip" requesting comments,
the Committee assumes that the Senator objects to the nomination
and declines to schedule confirmation hearings, particularly in
instances where the Senator shares the same party affiliation as the
President. 7  The blue slip procedure has historically provided
home-state Senators of the President's party with leverage in nomina-
tion because prudence counsels that the Executive consult with a
Senator before exercising veto power.171  Opposite-party Senators
from a judicial candidate's home state enjoy much less, although
occasionally significant, influence in nomination and confirma-
tion.1
72
The blue slip procedure and senatorial courtesy have been waning
in the last two decades. 7 ' Because strong vestiges remain, however,
167. For a recent monograph exploring this topic, seeJOHN DANFORTH, RESURRECTION: THE
CONFIRMATION OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994). Heated confirmation battles are not, of course,
limited to Supreme Court justices. For a list of recent lower court nominations that aroused
opposition in the Senate, see LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS & POLICY 127 (2d
ed. 1990).
168. See, e.g., Guy Gugliotta & Lynne Duke, Alone in the Crowd, the President's Man Faces His
Judges, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1991, at A19 (describing Senator John Danforth as Clarence
Thomas' chief sponsor); Mary McGrory, A Justice in Training, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1990, at A2
(describing Senator Warren Rudman as David Souter's chief sponsor); Marianne Means, With
Ginsburg, ClintonDid Well-About Time, HouS. CHRON.,June 15,1993, atAl9 (describing Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan as Ruth Bader Ginsburg's unofficial chief sponsor).
169. SeeBAUM, supra note 167, at 119-20, 126; ROBERTA. CARP & RONALD SnTDHAM,JUDICIAL
PROCESS IN AMERICA 239-40 (2d ed. 1993) (describing Senate's role in judicial appointment
process).
170. See Elliott E. Slotnick, The Changing Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in Judicial
Selection, in CoURTS, LAW, AND JUDICiAL PROCESSES 121 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., 1981) (describing
effect of political affiliation on "blue slip" procedure).
171. BAUM, supra note 167, at 119-20; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1508 n.82.
172. BAUM, supra note 167, at 120.
173. BAuM, supra note 167, at 121, 126; Slotnick, supra note 170, at 122-24; Strauss &
Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1508 & n.82; see also Eva M. Rodriguez & Daniel Klaidman, List Has
Distinctly Local Favor Administration EyeingEight CandidatesforD.C. Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 19,
1993, at 18 (suggesting that Clinton administration generally intends to make appellate choices
itself, but perhaps to defer to Senators on district court nominations).
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these traditions continue to offer prominent benefactor status for
home-state Senators. Thus, along with senatorial sponsorship, sena-
torial courtesy opens opportunities for a Senator to forge strong
personal bonds with judicial candidates. 74
Despite considerable chances for individual Senators to ingratiate
themselves to judicial appointees, no certainty exists that a Senator
will have occasion to benefit from her benefactor status in litigation
before the judge. Like the Senate as a whole, an individual Senator's
opportunities for benefit are far more remote than the Executive
Branch's.
Nevertheless, because of the potential strength of the bond between
Senator and judge, we should not ignore the possibilities. Acting as
litigant, attorney, or both, a Senator with a special project or desire
to attract publicity may litigate national issues,' 75 particularly within
the federal courts in the District of Columbia, that come before one
of the Senator's beneficiaries. Similarly, home-state Senators may use
the federal judicial process at home to sue over matters of more local
interest.1 76 This latter scenario is particularly noteworthy given that
the relatively high odds that the Senator was directly responsible for
the adjudicator's job. Furthermore, an individual Senator may be
involved in personal litigation before a judge bearing gratitude and
loyalty toward the Senator.177 Finally, whether in national or local
litigation, the Senator, although not a formal party to the suit, could
always have a strong personal or professional interest in an issue.
3. Other potential benefactors
Aside from individual Senators, another player consulted during
nomination and confirmation is the American Bar Association (ABA).
In fact, one Supreme Court scholar describes the ABA's Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary as "enormously influential" in
174. See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text (analyzing influence of senatorial courtesy
on nominee's feelings of loyalty and gratitude).
175. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976) (including individual Senator among
plaintiffs challenging provision of Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971); Riegle v. Federal
Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 878-80 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (involving individual Senator who
filed challenge to constitutionality of procedures established by Federal Reserve Act).
176. See, e.g., Specter v. Garrett, 971 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir.) (challenging proposed closure
of Philadelphia naval shipyard), vacated 113 S. Ct. 455 (1992); Karchin v. Metzenbaum, 587 F.
Supp. 563, 564 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (involving constituent's suit against Senator alleging
incompetent handling of letter to Senator that resulted in loss of employment).
177. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Senator Sues over Lost Trut Fund, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1993, at
A20 (detailing Senator Bond's suit in Federal Court in St. Louis against investment adviser
alleging mismanagement of personal funds); Mark Potts, Metzenbaur Sued on Little Tavern Sale,
WASH. Posr, Aug. 27, 1991, at D9 (describing details of suit against Senator Metzenbaum
alleging fraud in personal business deal).
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federal judicial selection.1 78 The Standing Committee's influence
apparently peaked during the Nixon administration, when it enjoyed
absolute veto power over lower federal court appointments.'79
Nevertheless, after the Haynsworth/Carswell debacle, where the
Standing Committee found both nominees qualified, the Nixon
Administration retracted the committee's veto power.180 Today, the
committee's role is limited to advising the Executive Branch on the
qualifications of prospective nominees, rather than actually generating
the names of nominees.
181
Like the Senate, the ABA's present role is significant for its
potential negative effect: a poor rating by the ABA can doom a
candidate, but a favorable rating provides no guarantee of confirma-
tion. Thus, a nominee who is eventually confirmed is, in most
instances, likely to view a favorable ABA rating as one of many hurdles
in the process, rather than a benefit requiring repayment in some
form. The ABA, therefore, does not stand as a powerful benefactor
for federal judges.
The final notable class of potential benefactors for judicial
candidates is composed of sitting and retired judges."2 Available
evidence indicates that Executive officials occasionally solicit nomina-
tion advice from present and former members of the judiciary. The
details are somewhat sketchy, with history rarely reflecting unequivo-
cally that the judges, rather than the officials, bore primary responsi-
bility for candidate selection. The most notable exception is Chief
Justice Taft, who apparently enjoyed unmatched control over the
judicial selections of Presidents Harding and Coolidge.'
Where a recommending judge sits on the court to which the
candidate is destined, this recommending procedure could bear a
high cost in terms of the judicial independence of the candidate.
Owing one's job to a peer may not be a comfortable state of affairs
for the candidate, and could breed potential loyalty and gratitude
178. ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 32; see also BAUM, supra note 167, at 115 (stressing success
of ABA in influencing President's choice ofjudicial candidates).
179. ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 32.
180. ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 32.
181. ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 33-39.
182. See ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 29; CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 169, at 235.
Occasionally, private individuals can act as benefactors, although examples of this are rare.
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND 107-08 (1994) (observing that turn-of-century maritime lawyer
Charles C. Burlingham "launched a number of distinguished judicial careers-including Learned
Hand's in 1909 and, four years later, Benjamin Cardozo's").
183. ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 30-31; CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 169, at 235. Another
example of a Justice's pressure on the President is Felix Frankfurter's promotion of Learned
Hand. See GUNTHER, supra note 182, at 554-55 (describing Frankfurter's use of enormous
pressure to get Franklin Roosevelt to appoint Learned Hand to Supreme Court).
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issues. Further analysis of the problem, however, is probably best left
for less ambiguous historical data.
B. How Does the Benefactor Identif the Beneficiary?
Because of the President's commanding role in selecting nominees,
scholars have devoted considerable effort to documenting various
criteria used by Presidents in making nomination decisions. As a
result, these criteria are relevant not only when the Executive acts as
primary benefactor, but in instances where another individual or
group may have played a key role in the appointment. Careful study
of these criteria is therefore helpful in analyzing the clash of
impartiality with gratitude and loyalty. Indeed, although moral
philosophy and social norms may excuse the judge from formal duties
of gratitude and loyalty, the selection criteria are important to under-
standing the persistent psychological and emotional effect of these
sentiments.
The criteria used to select nominees are fluid, with each blending
into the other. Moreover, several different factors will most likely
motivate a proponent's decision to back a certain judicial candidate.
In many cases, a candidate may also have difficulty ascertaining
precisely what provoked a benefactor's support or may incorrectly
perceive the benefactor's motivations. Despite these limitations, the
following categories serve as useful analytic tools: (1) the nominee is
perceived to possess certain ideological predispositions; (2) the
nominee has engaged in political activities or support deserving of
reward; (3) the nomination will be useful in gramering political favors
for the benefactor; (4) the nominee possesses significant demographic
characteristics; and (5) the nominee has a high degree of competence
and ethical standards.1" Empirical evidence suggests that these
standards govern the nomination of Supreme Courtjustices as well as
lower court judges, although the prominence of various factors may
differ depending on the type ofjudgeship.185
184. SeeABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 65 (analyzing selection criteria); BAUM, supra note 167,
at 116-17, 123-26 (analyzing selection criteria); see also DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITlcS 66 (3d ed. 1993) (claiming that considerations such as
ideology, race, religion, gender, and ethnicity, as well as factors of compatibility and political
opposition, compete with merit in making judicial selections).
185. See BAUM, supra note 167, at 123-24; CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 169, at 234. For a
study of the selection criteria for United States court of appealsjudges, see generally Rayman
L. Solomon, The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts' Role in Regulating America: U.S.
Courts of AppealsJudgeshipsfrom T.R. toF.D.R., 1984 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 285.
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1. Ideology
In recent years, ideology has been a key factor in judicial selec-
tion.18 Few seriously doubt that ideology plays a legitimate role in
the nomination and confirmation process."8 7 In fact, the experience
of the Reagan and Bush administrations suggests that the political and
jurisprudential predisposition of judicial candidates was the most
important criterion in nomination decisions for Supreme Court and
lower court vacancies." While confirmation battles in the Senate
186. See BAUM, supra note 167, at 116 (describing increasing prominence of ideology as
selection criterion for Supreme Court and district court vacancies); see also supra note 129
(defining "ideology").
The importance of ajudicial candidate's ideology is hardly a new phenomenon, particularly
for Supreme Court nominations. See S. Sidney Ulmer, Some TheoreticalPerspectives on Packing the
Supreme Cour4 in COURTS, LAW, AND JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 170, at 251-54 (describing
historical importance of candidate's party affiliation and policy preferences). Examples of
Presidents strongly motivated by ideology include George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and
James Madison. See ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 71-72, 85, 88; see also Christopher E. Smith &
KimberlyA. Beuger, Clouds in the Cystal Balk PresidentialExpectations and the Unpredictable Behavior
of Supreme Court Appointees, 27 AKRON L. REV. 115, 116 (1993) (describing how Executive's
"perceptions about sharing philosophical values and policy preferences with the nominee...
exert influence over nearly every nomination"). Forjudgeships on the court of appeals, Rayman
L. Solomon documents the increased prominence of "policy preference" as a selection criterion
"during Wilson's administration and the latter years of both the Roosevelts' administrations."
Solomon, supra note 185, at 285.
187. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How rr WAS, How IT Is 235
(1987) (disagreeing with notion that President should not nominate person whose constitutional
philosophy President endorses); Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 273, 315 (1989) (arguing that ideology has influenced, and should continue to influence,
selection of federal judges without constitutional objection).
188. See, e.g., CARP & SnIDHAM, supra note 169, at 248 (stating that "Ronald Reagan provides
a good example of a chief executive who selected his judicial nominees with a clear eye toward
their compatibility with his own conservative philosophy"); Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting
Behavior ofJudges Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298, 301 (Apr.-May 1993) (stating
that Bush had "a fairly strong commitment to making ideologically based judicial appoint-
ments"); Goldman, supra note 158, at 296 (suggesting that Bush "made the federal bench far
more conservative than when Reagan took office"); Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Selection and the
Pursuit ofJustice: The Unsettled Relationship Between Law and Morality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1989) (noting that 1980 Republican Platform "unmistakably promised that President Reagan
would scrutinize ajudicial candidate's political or judicial philosophy"); Ezra Bowen,Judges with
Their Minds Right TIME, Nov. 4, 1985, at 77 (quoting Sheldon Goldman of University of
Massachusetts, who contends that Ronald Reagan's commitment to changing ideological makeup
of federal courts was "most self-conscious ideological selection process since the first Roosevelt
Administration"). But cf Timothy B. Tomasi &Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President's Men? A
Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 766, 767
(1987) (presenting statistical study showing that "Reagan judges are not significantly more
conservative than their Republican colleagues"). For a review of the selection procedures of
recent past administrations, see generally Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257, 1258-1274.
Information on the Clinton administration is still inconclusive. See, e.g., Richard Berke, What's
Delaying Choice of High Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1993, at A24 (listing ideal attributes
of Supreme Court nominee sought by Clinton administration); Stephen Labaton, President's
Judicial Appointments: Diverse, but Well in the Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A15
(reporting that Clinton's selections are "not expected to change the ideological hue of the
bench, although they have won high praise for their diversity and quality"); Stephen Labaton,
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are often premised on more "objective" complaints, such as the
nominee's deficient legal ability or ethical record, ideology historically
has acted as an important, although sometimes veiled, impetus behind
Senate confrontations.18 9
Although ideology is prominent and easy to identify as a selection
criterion, its influence on the potential clash of loyalty, gratitude, and
impartiality is elusive. On one hand, judicial choices based on
ideology have a significant potential to exacerbate impartiality's clash
with loyalty and gratitude. As suggested above, ajudge with no doubt
that ideology motivated her appointment may feel increased loyalty
and gratitude obligations in making decisions. Burdened with this
baggage, the judge must occasionally confront cases for which she
believes the facts and law require a disposition at odds with the
ideological position for which she was appointed.
On the other hand, a number of factors may mitigate the disso-
nance experienced by the judge. For example, a true ideologue may
be less susceptible to influence from a benefactor than a less
dogmatic appointee. 9 ' To be sure, a judge with an established
ideological track record may satisfy her benefactor by routinely
making decisions consistent with her record. Whenever there is
disagreement with the benefactor, however, the judge's character and
history as an ideologue may make her less open to alternatives, and
less vulnerable to the pull of gratitude and loyalty. 1 '
While not entirely conclusive, philosophical literature also suggests
that-ideological resolve or not-an individual's debt of loyalty and
gratitude is reduced where the benefactor is motivated by a strong
selfish purpose. Some philosophers even suggest that the moral
obligation of gratitude may be reduced or even eliminated where the
benefactor is motivated by "self-interest,"'92 or provides a benefit for
the specific purpose of generating a debt of gratitude.' One
Shifting List of Prospects to beJustice, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1993, at A22 (reporting that in selecting
replacement forJustice White, Clinton and advisors "have said they are looking for a progressive
thinker who believes in a constitutional right to abortion and privacy as well as someone who
would be able to forge coalitions").
189. See BAUM, supra note 167, at 127 (reviewing selected lower court nominations that
aroused Senate opposition between 1979 and 1988).
190. My colleague, Professor Richard Greenstein, first suggested this observation to me.
191. See Ulmer, supra note 186, at 254-56 (suggesting that judge's ideological resolve is
strengthened where judge has communicated to others her commitment to certain ideological
perspective).
192. See SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 170-75, 178; see also Fred Berger, Gratitude, 85 ETHICS 298,
299 (1975) (suggesting that gratitude is owed only where benefactor acted with desire to help
beneficiary).
193. See Roslyn Weiss, The Moral and Social Dimensions of Gratitude, 23 So. J. PHIL. 491, 495
(1985) (stating that one necessary condition for gratitude is that benefactor must provide
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philosopher, A. John Simmons, has also argued that a duty of
gratitude will never emerge if the benefactor expended no special
effort in providing the benefit.
194
For the federal judiciary, these points merit attention because the
judge's benefactor may help the judge for mercenary reasons or may
be merely "doing her job" in promoting the nomination and confir-
mation. Several arguments indicate, however, that the ideological
appointee may continue to feel a strong debt to her benefactors. To
begin with, one can dispute whether a benefactor who is intent on
packing the courts with like-minded persons is indisputably "selfish"
or mercenary. One could instead characterize the benefactor's
motivation as communitarian, evangelical, or public-spirited.
Therefore, the benefactor's motivations may not necessarily under-
mine the judge's feelings of gratitude or loyalty.
Even assuming that the benefactor expended no extraordinary
effort and that her motivations are not entirely praiseworthy, a sense
of debt may also arise simply because the benefit conferred-a federal
judgeship-is so precious. 195  Under this view, the benefactor's
motivation and minimal effort can mitigate, but cannot obliterate, the
beneficiary's obligation of thankfulness owed in response to the
extraordinary gain. 196
Other factors may lessen the judge's perception that her impartiali-
ty is compromised by the ideological motivations behind her
appointment. Specifically, the judge may conclude that she was
appointed to act as a judicial delegate of a certain ideology and that
she may represent this perspective without threat to her ability to
judge cases in a neutral, detached manner. Moreover, federal law
governingjudicial disqualification focuses on matters such as financial
interest, familial relationship, or personal hatred, while generally
remaining silent on political or ideological bias.'97 In fact, the law
discourages investigation into the social or ideological predispositions
of a sitting judge.' 9 Indeed, the case law displays tolerance for
benefit freely and without objective for gain); see alsoJOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 134 (1980) (asserting that it is essential that benefactor give gift freely in
order to engender sense of obligation in beneficiary).
194. SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 170-75, 178.
195. See McCONNELL, supra note 15, at 20 (asserting that gratitude may still be owed when
benefactor's actions were small or self-serving but impact on beneficiary is enormous).
196. MCCONNELL, supra note 15, at 20-30.
197. Leubsdorf, supra note 80, at 258 (noting how "disqualification statutes say nothing about
ideological bias").
198. See Leubsdorf, supra note 80, at 256 (observing that present law "discourages investi-
gation of social or political bias on the bench"); Redish & Marshall, supra note 62, at 500-01
(stating that Supreme Court has gone to great lengths not to disqualify judge ifjudge possesses
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procedural systems allowing an adjudicator to preside over a matter
in which she was earlier involved or expressed a public opinion. 99
As Chief Justice Rehnquist once said, "Proof that a Justice's mind at
the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area
of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualifica-
tion, not lack of bias."
200
The preceding argument suggests that one cannot precisely gauge
the ideology's influence as a selection factor. Several considerations,
such as the benefactor's potential self-interest, the likely personality
characteristics of an ideological appointee, and the present state of
impartiality law mitigate ideology's role in the clash of gratitude,
loyalty, and impartiality. These points, however, should not mask
ideology's potential to influence decisionmaking. As a selection
criterion, ideology is particularly treacherous because it can reduce a
judge's freedom to select the appropriate avenue for expressing
gratitude and loyalty. Where ideology motivates a judge's appoint-
ment, the judge's benefactors anticipate ideological faithfulness from
the judge in executing her duties. Although impartiality may require
otherwise, feelings of gratitude and loyalty instruct the judge not to
spurn her benefactor's expectations. Through this mechanism, the
benefactor can impose her influence throughout the judge's docket,
even in those cases where the benefactor made no effort to express
a preferred disposition through an amicus brief, a public statement,
or otherwise.
2. Reward for political support
Reward for political activities or support has played a more
consistent role in nominations of lower court judges than Supreme
Court Justices.20 1 For lower court judgeships, empirical studies
documenting party activism among nominees suggest that past
no "direct financial interest" in pending matter); see also, e.g., Brody v. President & Fellows of
Harvard College, 664 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1981) (refusing to disqualify judge from hearing suit
against his alma mater), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982); Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 38,
35 (D. Idaho 1979) (stating general rule thatjudge is not prevented from hearing cases simply
because he comes to case with general personal experiences, associations, and beliefs).
199. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 839 (1972) (involving circumstances whereby
then-Justice Rehnquist refused to disqualify himself from participating in decision concerning
legal issue about which he had publicly spoken before taking bench); FTC v. Cement Inst., 833
U.S. 683, 700 (1948) (allowing FTC to adjudicate case, even though "entire membership of
Commission" had previously assessed issues in case "as a result of its prior official investiga-
tions"); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 802 F.2d 658, 659 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that prior
experience with similar lawsuit is not ground for disqualification).
200. Laird, 409 U.S. at 835; see also Cipollone 802 F.2d at 659-60 (holding that prior
experience with legal issues is not ground for disqualification).
201. BAuM, supra note 167, at 123-24.
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political activity is often an important selection factor."2 Presidents,
Executive officials, and Senators all use lower court judgeships to
reward lawyers who helped advance their political careers. Yet, the
role of political reward in Supreme Court nominations should not be
underestimated. History furnishes many episodes where Presidents
appointed loyal political foot soldiers and powerful party allies to the
Court.
203
Principles of social exchange instruct that ajudge receiving herjob
as a political favor is apt to look to her judgeship as a means for
showing gratitude and loyalty.204 After all, these virtues may have
given her the position in the first place. Moreover, when the
benefactor simply tried to be "decent" by showing gratitude and
thankfulness for favors received from the judge, the benefactor's
motives may be sufficiently "pure" (as a matter of philosophical
theory) to make possible a return obligation of gratitude. Making
matters worse, the return obligation may be directly relevant to
decisionmaking, since the obligation arose in a relationship defined
by political, and possibly ideological, affinity. For that reason, the
return obligation may be similar to that arising for an ideological
appointee: the obligation may influence many categories of cases, not
just those cases in which the benefactor has expressed a position.20 5
Closer scrutiny, however, uncovers complexities. To the extent that
the benefactor is acting to return the judge's past favors, all parties
may understand that the award of the judgeship completes the
202. See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judkial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up,
72JUDICATURE 318, 321-22, 324-25 (Apr.-May 1989) (using data to claim that in decade before
1988, approximately 55% of district court appointees and approximately 65% of court of appeals
appointees engaged in past party activism). For a particularly candid and graphic account of
the role of politics in the process of becoming a lower federal court judge, see Judge Joseph
Samuel Perry, How I Got to be a FederalJudge, in COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS 168 (Walter F.
Murphy & C. Herman Pritchett eds., 2d ed. 1974).
203. Examples include: Eisenhower and Earl Warren; Truman and all four of his nomi-
nations (Burton, Vinson, Clark, and Minton); Kennedy and his two picks (White and Goldberg);
Johnson and Fortas; several of Lincoln's choices (Swayne, Davis, and Chase); and Andrew
Jackson and Roger Taney. See ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 254-56, 241, 276-77, 289-90, 118-20,
and 99-100.
204. Under traditional sociological theory, social exchange does not continue unless both
parties to the exchange are making a profit. See HOMANS, supra note 137, at 61-69. Applied
here, this theory suggests that the benefactor and the judge both expect that the judge will
profit by the appointment and the benefactor will profit in some other way. A likely source of
profit for the benefactor is for the judge to take some beneficial action in the context of her
job. But seeJ.K. CHADWICK-JONES, SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY: ITS STRUCrURE AND INFLUENCE
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 210-26 (1976) (discussing criticisms of Homan's theory on social
exchange and profit); SKIDMORE, supra note 137, at 18-28 (criticizing Homan's theory of sodal
behavior).
205. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing phenomenon in context ofjudge
appointed because of her ideological predispositions).
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reciprocity cycle, °6 generating no further obligations. This under-
standing may be explicit between the parties, or may be the product
of general sociological principles. As we know, social exchange does
not always require direct reciprocity.2 7  Friendship studies instruct
that membership in a relationship can be more important than direct
return of a benefit received from another party in the relation-
ship.20 8  In many circumstances, a member of a political
group-through her relationship with the group-may be selected for
209a judgeship, yet excused from direct return of the benefit.
According to the rules of politics, some favors carry with them the
explicit obligation of return and others do not. A political favor like
a judgeship, which includes a job requirement of impartiality, is a
good candidate for suspension of the return obligation. The
members of the group may understand that the judgeship is a big
prize-one gained only after years of service to the group and one
which the group understands to be exempt from the reciprocity cycle.
To the extent possible, field study would be invaluable in testing
the hypothesis that social exchange expectations are often suspended
for recipients of a federal judgeship. The hypothesis suggests,
however, that a significant limitation on the influence of social
exchange in decisionmaking exists.
3. Garnering political favors from third parties
A benefactor may support a judicial candidate in order to please
other players in the political process. In this circumstance, the
benefactor is not rewarding the candidate for anything the candidate
did, but is paying off a political favor or garnering political support
from a third-party. This practice is reflected in anecdotal incidents
throughout history20 and is institutionalized in the tradition of
senatorial courtesy.211 When senatorial courtesy in involved, an
206. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text (discussing role of reciprocity in society).
207. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text (discussing complexities of reciprocity
analysis).
208. See supra notes 57-60 (describing sociological and anthropological literature on
friendship theory).
209. See supra note 202 (discussing appointed judges and their past party activism).
210. See ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 145 (describing how Grover Cleveland nominated
Senator E.D. White to Supreme Court in attempt to ingratiate himself to Senate); id. at 256
(reporting that Eisenhower is said to have appointed Warren as favor to California politicians
who wanted Warren out of California politics); BAUM, supra note 167, at 124 (describing vote-
trading and threatened retaliation in 1987 confirmation ofJudge William Dwyer).
211. See BAUM, supra note 167, at 124 (finding that executive deference to Senators in
selection ofjudges "constitutes yet another kind of pursuit of political support"); Solomon, supra
note 185, at 335-36 (revealing that Presidents Harding and Coolidge deferred almost completely
to Senators' choices for court of appeals judgeships).
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Executive may nominate a particular candidate in order to win
political support from the nominee's home-state Senator, another
individual Senator, or other political leaders.
212
Where a benefactor, such as the Executive, promotes a nominee in
order to generate or satisfy political obligations with a third-party, the
nominee may view herself simply as a pawn in the political process.
For a number of reasons, the nominee's feelings of gratitude and
loyalty toward the promoter may accordingly be minimal.213 First,
the nomination lacks the element of personal exchange present when
a benefactor acts to reward the nominee's political service. In
addition, moral philosophy suggests that the benefactor's motivation
eliminates any trace of loyalty and gratitude obligations because the
benefactor is not acting to help the nominee214 and the benefactor's
motivation is arguably self-interested. 215 At the least, the nominee
is not likely to view the benefactor's actions as calling for a direct
return of benefit. In fact, the benefactor likely expects repayment
only from the third-party, not the nominee.
The analysis thus far focuses on only one benefactor-the individu-
al who acts to repay or to ingratiate a third-party. That third-party,
however, is another potential benefactor of the nominee. For
example, the third-party may be a Senator who proposes the
nominee's name in order to reward the nominee for faithful support
to the Senator. In that case, the earlier analysis of direct political
reward may shed light on the relationship between the third-party
Senator and the nominee. This situation may be unique given that
the impersonal nomination process and the nominee's status as an
instrument in political exchange may mitigate her personal feelings
of gratitude and loyalty toward the Senator. It is possible, however,
that the nominee may view the nomination as reward for membership
and faithfulness to a political group. From that perspective, friend-
ship analysis and principles of group loyalty suggest that she may bear
strong sentiments of gratitude and loyalty toward both the Executive
and the Senator.
212. JOSEPH HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 216-17 (1953).
213. See Oldenquist, supra note 8, at 179-80 (suggesting that nominee, once appointed, will
have more loyalty to larger organization or community rather than individual benefactor, and
will possibly view benefactor's interests as conflicting with those of large community).
214. See Weiss, supra note 193, at 495 (proposing that benefactor's intent to help recipient
of benefit constitutes necessary condition for obligation of gratitude).
215. Seesupranotes 192-95 andaccompanying text (discussingself-interested motivations that
may eliminate debts of gratitude and loyalty).
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4. Demographics
Key players injudicial selection often use demographics in choosing
candidates." Although demographics is a common selection cri-
terion, potential benefactors of ajudicial candidate may have varying
motivations for focusing on the race, gender, regional affiliation, or
religious identity of the candidate. On one hand, the benefactor may
be using demographics in an effort to strengthen political support
among certain groups in society.21" Alternatively, the benefactor
may be trying either to tailor a judiciary that approximates society's
demographic diversity or to ensure that historically disempowered
groups are represented on the federal bench. 8
For a federal judge, the conflict of impartiality with loyalty and
gratitude will vary depending on which of these motivations predomi-
nate. If it is clear that the benefactor is primarily seeking political
support from the population group the judge represents, the judge
bears diminished pressure to use the judicial process for expressing
gratitude and loyalty. Because the benefactor is acting with a self-
interested purpose, the judge's debt is lessened or eliminated.
Moreover, to the extent that pangs of obligation remain, the judge
may satisfy those feelings, in large measure, merely by continuing to
possess the demographic characteristic motivating her appointment.
Under this view, ajudge appointed because she is a woman meets her
benefactor's needs by continuing to possess the identity of "woman"
while performing her judicial duties. Quite possibly, the benefactor
who is merely trying to garner votes is concerned with the symbolism
of having appointed a woman rather than with ensuring that the
nominee performs her duties in a way that specially "represents"
women's interests. For this benefactor, the judge need not take
affirmative steps to act in a representative capacity, whatever that may
be; she need only "be" a woman.
In contrast, the benefactor interested in diversity or empowerment
216. President Carter actually issued an executive order formalizing the administration's
consideration of demographics. See Exec. Order No. 12059, 3 C.F.R. 180, 182 (1978) (stating
that nominating panels are "encouraged to make special efforts to seek out and identify well
qualified women and members of minority groups as potential nominees"). The record of other
modem Presidents reflects a similar concern with demographics. See BAUM, supra note 167, at
117 (describing Nixon's appointment ofJustice Powell as "effort to appealto Southern voters");
Goldman, supra note 158, at 294 (describing Bush's appointment of women and minorities).
217. BAUM, supra note 167, at 124.
218. See ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 61-64 (discussing expectation that certain seats on
Supreme Court may be dedicated to certain demographic group); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD
SAVE THIs HONORABLE COURT 106 (1985) (discussing "long tradition of conscious attention to
the geographic and religious diversity" of Supreme Court).
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of specific groups is apt to be more concerned that the nominee
actually represent her demographic group. For many aspects of her
job, it will be impossible, unnecessary, or absurd for the judge to
ascertain how a "woman's representative" should perform a given task.
But in cases where the judge has a clear view of how her representa-
tive role should influence herjob, the judge may experience the clash
of impartiality against loyalty and gratitude.219
Like judges appointed for their ideological predispositions, the
judge appointed to represent a demographic group has benefactors
who expect her to decide cases in a certain way. In cases where it is
plain how those expectations should affect her decisionmaking, and
when those expectations are in tension with the disposition the judge
would otherwise reach, the judge may feel the strong tug of gratitude
and loyalty. After all, the benefactor's motivations in appointing the
judge are apparently unselfish and civic-minded. Thus, the benefac-
tor is better-positioned to expect loyalty and gratitude from the
judge.220  Making matters worse, the judge is likely to feel some
obligation to express her loyalty and gratitude by meeting the
benefactor's expectations about the substance of her decisions,
thereby threatening the judge's ability to perform her duties with
impartiality and detachment
221
Benefactors concerned with diversity and representation of
disempowered groups may be said to have a more noble purpose in
promoting judicial candidates than benefactors focused solely on
getting votes or political support. The ironic result of the above
analysis, however, is that the "noble" benefactors are more likely to
increase dissonance for their appointees than benefactors pursuing
selfish ends.
5. Competence
Competence is, of course, universally held out as a minimum
prerequisite of eligibility for the federal bench. Formally and
.219. The goals of impartiality and representation of diverse demographic groups are in many
ways consistent. Indeed, both impartiality and fair representation "include a basic idea about
the distribution of experiences necessary to render fair judgments." Martha Minow, Stripped
Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality ofJudges and Juror, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1202, 1206 (1992).
220. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text (explaining morally disqualifying
motivations of benefactor).
221. As noted earlier, standard impartiality doctrine does not proscribe social and cultural
bias in the same way that it condemns financial interest in litigation, familial relationship with
litigants, and personal hatred of litigants, see supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. Thus,
a judge appointed to represent a segment of the population may experience less dissonance
than she would if the law were less tolerant of ajudge's predispositions to certain groups.
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informally, judicial candidates are reviewed for their fitness to meet
the demands of a federal judgeship. Less frequent are circumstances
where judicial candidates are singled out simply because they possess
exceptionally high intelligence, wisdom, legal skill, and ethical
standards. Nevertheless, history yields examples of where these
qualities appeared as the most significant factor behind a candidate's
selection.222
There could be a number of reasons why a benefactor may be
motivated to promote ajudicial candidate on the basis of competence
alone. From a self-interested perspective, the benefactor may want to
increase political capital, trying to convey the public image that she
is working hard in the country's best interest.22 At the other end
of the spectrum, the benefactor's actions may be more altruistic, such
as where the benefactor turns a deaf ear to political pressure and
instead promotes a candidate believed to possess the best qualities for
the job.224
The perceived motivation behind the appointment will, of course,
influence the degree of gratitude and loyalty the judge feels. As
explained earlier, a beneficiary's moral obligation to reciprocate is
reduced as the benefactor's motivation becomes perceived as more
selfish.2 25 Such subtle distinctions, however, may not be greatly
important here: to the extent that special debts of gratitude and
loyalty attach for the judge appointed for her exemplary competence,
the judge can largely meet the benefactor's expectations simply by
222. The most prominent examples are President Wilson's nomination ofJustice Brandeis
and President Hoover's nomination ofJustice Cardozo. SeeABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 180-85,
200, 204-07 (discussing factors influencing those nominations); TRIBE, supra note 218, at 81
(discussing events surrounding Cardozo's nomination); see also Solomon, supra note 185, at 328-
35 (suggesting that "professionalism" was dominant selection criterion for Taft and Hoover
administrations, including, for Taft, qualities of "intelligence, close reasoning, careful
explanations of result, a respect for precedent, and an ability to dispatch work quickly"); Strauss
& Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1505 n.71 (citingJustice Stevens as another possible example of
Justice appointed primarily based on quality and character); Aaron Epstein & Charles Green,
Clinton Nominates Breyer Boston Jurist is Consensus-Builder, DET. FREE PRESS, May 14, 1994, at Al
(describing Stephen Breyer as another example, stating that "those who know Breyer best say
he's terrifically smart and quick-witted-and so fair and open-minded that he can listen carefully
to warring advocates and come up with an ingenious solution that makes them think they won");
Susan Estrich, The Nation: Concentrating on Process, We Miss Breyer's Strengths, L.A. TIMES, May 22,
1994, at M2 (expressing similar view of Breyer).
223. President Clinton's nomination of Stephen Breyer is a possible example. See The
MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour transcript no. 4926, May 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News library,
MACLEH file (remarks of President Clinton) (explaining, during news conference announcing
Breyer nomination, that Breyer could give American people confidence in Supreme Court and
help them feel that Court is accessible to them).
224. President Wilson's nomination ofJustice Brandeis may be an example of this, although
history also reflects strong personal and political connections between the two men dating well
before the nomination. ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 180-85..
225. See supra notes 192-95.
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being extremely competent. Presumably, this competence includes
the ability to satisfy fully the judge's duty of impartiality.
As a selection criterion, competence may be the least problematic
of all. It is neutral in that it carries no expectations about the
substance of the judge's decisions; it also does not operate to fuel or
perpetuate feelings of personal obligation or exchange cycles between
judge and benefactor. But even more significant, use of competence
as a criterion actually works to undercut the clash of loyalty and
gratitude against impartiality. By its own terms, competence encour-
ages a federal judge to cast aside the temptation to express loyalty and
gratitude through adjudication. Indeed, a judge who consciously
allows her beneficiary's outcome preferences to influence her
decisions would be disloyal to the beneficiary's wishes about the
judge's method of decisionmaking. Presumably, the beneficiary who
chooses the judge for her competence would be disappointed by any
deviation from the strictest standard of impartiality.
IV. THE IMPARTIALITY IDEAL: EVALUATING
ITS WISDOM AND REALITY
Analysis of selection criteria for federal judges shows that some
judges experience a more dramatic clash of expectations and duties
than others. Yet for all judges, powerful social norms and moral
principles operating outside the judicial context drive home the
importance of loyalty and gratitude. Although formally exiled from
the judicial process, these norms and principles are likely to spill over
into adjudication, often weighing heavily on the minds ofjudges. In
many cases, psychological and emotional forces may brand as disloyal
a judge who embarrasses or spurns her benefactor by rendering
decisions hostile to the benefactor's deeply held and clearly expressed
convictions. It is therefore important that we try to understand how
the clash of gratitude, loyalty, and impartiality can affect the
decisionmaking process for all judges.
Much contemporary legal scholarship has studied the proposition
that true impartiality is not possible. 226 As a model, the impartial
226. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging,
61 S. CA. L. REV. 1945, 1947 & n.7 (1988) (asserting that blind adherence to notions of
impartiality ignores reality that "judges do not step into the courtroom unconnected from their
lives or from their communities"); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601,
1626-28 (1986) (recognizing that no judge acts alone, outside social context); Martha Minow,
Foreward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L REV. 10, 70 (1987) (suggesting that one should reach
beyond assumption of "one reality" to accept that "[tihere is no neutrality, no escape from
choice"); Resnick, supra note 66, at 1904 (finding that while society seeks impartiality and
disassociation, decisions rarely reflect such qualities); cf Baron, supra note 88 (discussing current
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judge is symbolized by justice with a blindfold, justice without a point
of view, and justice without facts or historical backdrop other than
that presented by the litigants.227 Scholars have argued, however,
that to pretend that a judge can actually dispense justice in this way
is to assume, unrealistically, that the judge operates outside of a social
context.228  Moreover, our insistence that judges try to divorce
themselves from their social context may undermine valuable
opportunities for judges to incorporate in their work a spirit of
connectedness and understanding of that context.
This scholarship is ongoing and continues to struggle with questions
pertinent to the problem analyzed here. In particular, recognition of
the falsity of pure impartiality and the benefit of contextual
decisionmaking does not necessarily counsel judges to unharness all
personal feelings and predispositions.229 Merely because we are all
"interested" at some level does not mean that all kinds of consider-
ations have an appropriate role in decisionmaking.21° Put different-
ly, arguing that human passions and emotions can increase fairness
in judicial decisionmaking does not establish that all human responses
serve justice. But where do we draw the line? In the words of Patricia
Cain, we have not yet found a way to differentiate between "good
bias" and "bad."231
Continued study of these questions will likely shed light on the
appropriate role of loyalty and gratitude in decisionmaking. What is
clear at present, however, is that a system has been created under
which judges are struggling under inconsistent messages. As explored
critiques of impartiality among ethical theorists); Oldenquist, supra note 8 (contending that
impartial standpoints do not exist).
227. In a recent opinion,Justice Kennedy wrote as though such ajudge could exist: "Judges,
if faithful to their oath, approach every aspect of each case with a neutral and objective
disposition." Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1160 (1994) (KennedyJ., concurring).
228. See supra note 226. This scholarship proceeds from the premise that decisionmaking
involves resolution by reference to normative standards as well as general knowledge of the
world. Norms are not, universally shared by all individuals; nor (obviously) is one's knowledge
of the world. For these reasons, all decisionmaking by necessity must begin from a particular
perspective or point of view. Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 255, 270
(1994) ("All evaluation ... proceeds from a particular and contingent, although often
unacknowledged, perspective; it always starts from a contestable point of view."). The ideal of
an objective decision----"neutral" and "free from bias"-is therefore impossible to sustain. See
Resnick, supra note 67, at 1905 (finding that once individuals understand that there is no
"'objective stance,'" they realize that"' [t]here is no neutrality, no escape from choice'" (quoting
Minow, supra note 226, at 14, 70))).
229. See Leubsdorf, supra note 80, at 279 (discussing proper role ofjudge's personal views,
while recognizing problems of totally impartial judges and political judges).
230. See Leubsdorf, supra note.80, at 253 & n.91 (stating that judicial "disqualification can
be justified even if one does not believe in judicial neutrality or predictability"); Resnick, supra
note 66, at 1934 ("I would not want to embrace the view that because we are all 'interested' at
some level, no kinds of interest are disqualifying." (citing Cain, supra note 226, at 1947 n.7)).
231. Cain, supra note 226, at 1946.
750
1995] LoYALTY, GRATrTUDE, AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 751
earlier, our legal and social traditions make impartiality a job
requirement for a federal judge. Yet, other pressures reinforce
expectations that the judge express loyalty and gratitude to her
benefactor. As argued above, these expectations persevere in the face
of moral reasoning and social norms that exempt a judge from a-
formal duty to express loyalty and gratitude in decisionmaking.
Where ajudge is mindful of the impartiality ideal, how is she likely to
handle these countervailing expectations?
A. Empirical Observation
Our society's view is that newly appointed judges generally exhibit
strong ties to their benefactors, which may disappear over time.
Empirical studies document this wisdom,232 and history recounts
episodes where the voting patterns of Supreme Courtjustices initially
track the ideological preferences of the Executive who nominated
them, but show a languorous but identifiable path away from those
preferences.33
For my purposes, these observations are inconclusive. A judge's
changed voting patterns may reflect knowledge and understanding
separate from a growing sense of independence from the judge's
benefactors. In addition, some empirical work suggests that the
perceived tie between a judge's votes and the preferences of her
benefactors may be exaggerated.'M It is also unclear whether the
true effects of loyalty and gratitude on decisionmaking are too subtle
or insidious for the standard tools of history or empirical research to
record.
232. See, e.g., CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 169, at 298-301 (analyzing empirical data on
published opinions, which establishes that early decisions by Bush appointees are consistent with
Bush's ideology); Goldman, supra note 158, at 296 & n.35 (citing studies suggesting that
Reagan's appointees have "had a decisional impact that has made the federal bench far more
conservative than when Reagan took office").
233. Justice Harry Blackmun is perhaps the most often cited example of this phenomenon.
See, e.g., Bruce S. Rogow, Justice Hary A. Blackmun, 14 NOVA L. REV. 9, 9-11 (1989) (discussing
Blackmun's shift in ideology); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Judicial Philosophies in Collision: Justice
Blackmun, Garcia, and the Tenth Amendmen4 32 AIZ. L. REV. 749, 749-50 (1990) (noting
intellectual evolution of Blackmun); Note, supra note 145, at 717-19, 734-36 (discussing
Blackmun's transformation from "right" to "left of center" position on issues); see also DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 900-01 (1992) (discussingJustice Tom Clark's failure to vote as desired
by his benefactor, Harry Truman); ConstitutionalLaw ScholarsAssess Impact of Supreme Court's 1993-
94 Term, 63 U.S.L.W. 2229, 2230 (Oct. 18, 1994) (quoting ProfessorJesse Choper as saying that
Justice Souter has undergone "quickest change of any justice, at least in modem times");
Schwartz, supra note 145, at 1 (discussing post-appointment transformation of Earl Warren).
234. See Laura Duncan, Political Ties of Federal Judicial Appointees have Little Effect on Case
Outcomes: Researchers, CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., Feb. 23, 1993, at 1 (reporting on study showing that
.political affiliations of a president and the judges he appoints have no major effect on the
outcome of cases").
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For these reasons, further empirical study into the precise effect of
gratitude and loyalty on decisionmaking is vital. In the meantime,
however, our existing understanding of the decisionmaking process
suggests that the role of these sentiments in decisionmaking may be
significant.
B. Existing Understanding of Decisionmaking
Several scholars have characterized decisionmaking as an isolating
process.2 5 The act of adjudication may require the judge psycho-
logically to separate from the litigants and the forces that compose
the judge's "self." This separation presumably makes judging more
comfortable for most people. Although perhaps fueled by the judge's
inclination to avoid personal discomfort, the mental separation may
also help the judge to sever loyalty and gratitude and live up to the
expectation of impartiality.
Despite these observations, a judge's loyalty and gratitude remain
capable of deeply affecting adjudication. Because loyalty and
gratitude are so important to society's normative structure and
Western philosophical tradition, we must assume that these sentiments
are not easily dispelled, but instead are inclined to "stick to our ribs."
Like other powerful expectations and sympathies, loyalty and
gratitude are not likely to stay "on the emotion side of the line,"
removed from the professional task of decisionmaking.23' After all,
these obligations "do not spring literally from the heart rather than
the head,"237 and are not easily identified and removed from adjudica-
tion.
It may be that a judge can readily harness and isolate from
adjudication some bias-creating interests, such as personal financial
matters. Where such a tangible personal concern is implicated, a
judge may be able to identify the interest's potential effect on her
235. As explained by Patricia Cain:
I can think of no human act more likely to separate one person from another than the
act of judging. I cannot say with any confidence that the act of judging requires
separation to give it meaning and validity or whether we, as human beings, require the
separation as a psychological aid to reduce our own pain and conflict.
Cain, supra note 226, at 1946; see also Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for
Justice, 10 CARnozo L. 1.Ev. 37, 59 (1988) (finding that judges may need to distance or
disassociate themselves from full impact of their decisions in order to fulfill theirjudicial duties).
236. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 235, at 41-45 (discussing Justice Brennan's critique
of "bureaucratic rationality"); see also FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 170 (finding that individuals
cannot free themselves from emotional impulses); Rayman L. Solomon, U.S. Courts ofAppeals and
Their Judges: Howard's Courts of Appeals in the FederalJudicial System, 1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RFS.
J. 761, 767-70 (embracing view that political philosophy and professional norms interact in
complex ways through process of decisionmaking).
237. Minow & Spelman, supra note 235, at 45.
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reasoning, to conclude that the interest is clearly irrelevant to the case
at hand, and to take corrective action." 8 Given that gratitude and
loyalty are far less concrete, and their impact on a beneficiary
potentially more diffuse, a judge is less likely to segregate them from
the mental process of filtering, organizing, and interpreting the
information received as part of the litigation.19
The nature of law and legal decisionmaking makes matters worse.
Encountering a legal issue, a judge may initially conclude that
established law clearly ordains a "correct" disposition of the issue. Yet,
because legal issues are open-textured and possess many dimensions,
initial impressions are often wrong. As Duncan Kennedy explains:
"What at first [looks] open and shut is ajar, and what [looks] vague
and altogether indeterminate abruptly reveals itself to be quite firmly
settled under the circumstances."2' Consequently, principles of
conscientious decisionmaking exhort a judge to reconsider first
impressions and to develop counterarguments until a more fully
contemplated decision emerges. 41 This is not necessarily a process
confined to investigating competing legal rules governing a specific
issue, but also may include considering whether a dispute is properly
recharacterized in terms of a wholly different set of legal rules.
Whatever the precise analysis undertaken, a dutiful judge should
manipulate the relevant legal principles in a case before coming to a
resolution.
A problem emerges because this process of "playing around" with
the legal issues provides fruitful opportunities for the judge to
integrate "extraneous" factors into adjudication. Although the law
may identify the judge's personal loyalty and gratitude as contrary to
the impartiality ideal, the latitude encouraged by principles of "good"
decisionmaking allows the sentiments to prey on the judge, and to
affect her ultimate decision.
Thus, the structure of decisionmaking strengthens the potential of
loyalty and gratitude to influence adjudication. These sentiments,
238. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 62, at 502 n.176 (arguing that where pecuniary
interest is involved, fact that interest is "so clearly irrelevant is to some extent helpful since the
decider has no doubt that it is impermissible for him to consider it"). The appropriate
corrective action is often clear, although sometimes expensive. See Neil A. Lewis, Justice Breyer
Severs Ties to the Lloyd's Syndicate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at A24 (stating thatJustice Breyer
extricated himself from controversial Lloyds of London investment "at a hefty price").
239. Cf Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1355-57 (3d Cir. 1994) (analyzing
effects of loyalty on public officials outside judicial context).
240. Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 522 (1986).
241. Professor Kennedy even suggests that "the ideal of impartiality" requires this rumination
process ofjudges. Id. at 523.
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however, have yet another-very important and potentially pervert-
ing-dimension.
Because our traditions inculcate judges with ideals of impartiality
and disinterest, most judges are apt to believe that obligations of
personal gratitude and loyalty do not belong in adjudication. Thus,
when loyalty and gratitude seep into the judging process, they must
work by stealth. Because a judge may try to deny their influence on
a decision, gratitude and loyalty may inject into deliberations a
process of rationalization that threatens both to confuse the ultimate
result and to obscure the underlying reasoning. A judge intent on
denying or hiding the influence of loyalty and gratitude is thus likely
to sacrifice both clarity and candor in her decision, qualities that
enhance a decision's potential to guide and to educate litigants and
others interested in the outcome of a case.
242
CONCLUSION
On the issue of impartiality, an individual undertaking a federal
judgeship confronts a difficult task. Contemporary lawyers commonly
agree that the law is not wholly the product of neutral principles and
that a judge must choose among values as she shapes the law.
243
Yet, the standards governing impartiality in federal courts largely
assume that total judicial neutrality and dispassion are possible. The
process of mapping out a personal framework for decisionmaking is
therefore apt to create considerable discordance for the judge.
Added to this burden are the special pulls of gratitude and loyalty
toward the individuals who made possible the judge's job.
I have sought to show both that gratitude and loyalty can have a
powerful influence for a federal judge undertaking to decide a case.
The problem is complex because loyalty and gratitude pose a greater
potential problem for some judges than for others. This complexity
emerges to a great degree from the process of nomination and
confirmation, which often generates, or at least reinforces, a judge's
sense of loyalty and gratitude to her benefactors.
In the last few years, we have witnessed a wave of dissatisfaction with
the selection process for federal judges. Legal scholarship in par-
ticular has offered frequent critique and constructive suggestions for
242. See generally Robert A. Leflar, HonestJudicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 721 (1979);
Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TEMP. L.
REV. 629, 653-658 (1991) (discussing failure of federal court decision to provide more thorough
and balanced appraisal of countervailing considerations); David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial
Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) (discussing virtues of candor in decisionmaking).
243. See Leubsdorf, supra note 80, at 253.
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change.2" As it must, this scholarship recognizes that any change
ventured must weigh the impact of nomination and confirmation on
a number of segments of American life, including the constitutional
balance of powers and public perception of the judiciary.
To omit from these concerns the effect of any change on the
ultimate quality of judicial decisionmaking would, of course, be a
mistake. Thus, in studying any new selection procedure, we must
contemplate the procedure's potential for creating and invigorating
a judge's feelings of loyalty and gratitude to her benefactors. The
foregoing should, therefore, not only shed light on the process of
federal court decisionmaling in general, but also give much needed
guidance for evaluating proposed changes to judicial selection.
244. See generally CARTER, supra note 157 (advocating number of changes to process of
appointing federal judges); Stephen L. Carter, Why the Confirmation Process Can't Be Fixed, 1993
U. ILL L. REV. 1 (arguing that problems with confirmation process most likely arise from
country's ill-advised expectation that Supreme Court acts as national policymaker); Fein, supra
note 148, at 672 (advocating confining Senate's role in confirmation process to screening out
unfit characters); Nathaniel R.Jones, Whither GoestJudicial Nominations, Brown or Plessy?-Advice
and Consent Revisited 46 SMU L REV. 735 (1992) (reviewing debate over proper selection process
for federal judiciary); Mitchell McConnell, Haynsworth and CarwelL A New Senate Standard of
Excelence, 59 Ky. L.J. 7 (1970) (advocating deferential Senate role in selection process); GaryJ.
Simson, Taking the Court Seriously: A Proposed Approach to Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court
Nominees, 7 CONsT. COMMENTARY 283 (1990) (suggesting that Senate engage in searching inquiry
into nominee's views on issues of national significance in addition to nominee's basic fitness for
judicial office); Tobias, supra note 188, at 1274-78 (advocatingjudicial selection procedures that
emphasize merit and promote demographic and political balance); Yackle, supra note 187, at
273 (analyzing appropriate judicial selection criteria and mechanisms for implementing these
standards); see also supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (discussing various views of
appropriate role of Senate in confirmation and nomination).

